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NO-FAULT AUTO REPARATION IN FLORIDA:
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF
SOME OF ITS EFFECTS
Joseph W. Little*
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Any useful evaluation of the no-fault concept must test whether or not
programs such as the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act ac-
complish the goals claimed for them before their enactments. Ordinarily,
these goals will be to correct alleged deficiencies in the predecessor repara-
tions systems. In a simple system in which everything else remained
constant, testing whether success had been achieved would be easy. One
would merely measure specified parameters before the reform measure was
introduced and compare these baseline measurements to measurements
made afterwards. In Florida of the early 1970's, however, nothing remained
constant. The population was burgeoning as was the number of motor vehi-
cles on the highways (rising from 5,360,302 registered vehicles in 1971 to
6,382,298 in 1973). Furthermore, this was a period of extreme inflation in
the United States and Florida and of rapidly advancing medical costs, it was
a period in which shortages of petroleum-based energy supplies first had
tangible effects on the incidence of motor vehicle crashes, and it was a period
that saw major revisions in Florida's court structure. In sum, no-fault was
introduced into the midst of substantial general change, making it extremely
difficult to establish baselines for comparative measurement. In such periods,
comparisons must be made between what occurred under the no-fault plan
and what would have occurred had the superseded system remained in ef-
fect. Thus, for example, in comparing insurance costs one must ask what the
difference is between no-fault costs and costs as they would have been had
there been no change, instead of asking what the difference is between no-
fault costs and costs as they were before no-fault came into effect.
To evaluate Florida's no-fault system, five hypotheses were posited and
tested for validity. These hypotheses and the inferences that may be drawn
concerning them are summarized below. Before examining them, however,
the reader may gain some perspective in evaluating their importance from
the following remarks. The basic complaints about the third-party
insurance-based tort reparation system concerned unnecessary costs, un-
fairness in allocation of benefits, inefficiency in disbursement of benefits,
: Professor of Law, University of Florida. B.S., 1957, Duke University; M.S., 1961,
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and certain systemic defects, such as unnecessary congestion of court
dockets. A crucial point in evaluating any reform movement is to acknowl-
edge that none of these factors is independent of the others. For example,
to reduce total costs, including amounts paid out in benefits, and to expand
coverage for benefits may be inconsistent goals. On the other hand, to
reduce the portion of the costs consumed within the system and to expand
benefits may be quite consistent. It follows, therefore, that a no-fault
revision should be carefully designed with predetermined goals in mind and
should thereafter be evaluated on the basis of performance in achieving
those goals.
The Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act was designed to re-
duce the costs incurred in transferring money from insurance premium pay-
ers to beneficiaries and to expand coverage for personal injury benefits. It
was also designed to produce more fairness in the allocation of benefits to
injured victims, to eliminate delays in the receipt of benefits and to reduce
the proportion of personal injuries that result in litigation. The Florida law
also contained property damage no-fault provisions, which had parallel
goals. Although the property damage provisions were invalidated by the
Florida Supreme Court, sufficient experience had accrued to permit a report
on that aspect of the law. To test how well these goals were achieved in
the first two years of the new system's operation, data were gathered from
sample populations to test the following hypotheses about the workings of
no-fault. A brief summary of the conclusions of this study will be given for
each one.
Hypothesis 1: That no-fault will reduce the amount of litigation
arising out of automobile crashes in comparison to the tort
system.
The Florida no-fault system utilizes a tort threshold that was intended
to keep relatively minor personal injury cases out of the courts. Data from
Alachua and Dade Counties from 1972 and 1973 suggest that the Florida
system can reduce the frequency of personal injury litigation measurably.
Nevertheless, insurance companies complain that the law is being abused
by use of artifices to defeat thresholds, particularly in Dade County, with
a resulting increase in the number of suits being filed. No data are available
in this study nor are there any known to the author that quantify this
phenomenon.-
In contrast to the personal injury experience, insurance claims data
suggest that property damage no-fault has had little effect on the frequency
of law suits, mainly because claims involving only property damage always
have been settled by negotiation with very little ensuing litigation. No
marked change was seen.
Hypothesis 2: That the distribution of claims arising out of motor
vehicle crashes between third-party and first-party modes will
shift strongly toward first-party modes in a no-fault system.
The Florida no-fault law mandated that both first-party and third-party
personal injury insurance and third-party property damage insurance be
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carried by covered motorists. First-party property damage insurance re-
mained optional. Experience under no-fault showed a very substantial shift
from third-party to first-party claims for both personal injury and property
damage coverages. Differences in costs between the two claim modes give
importance to this otherwise modest finding. It appears clear that first-party
personal injury payments are less inflated by nuisance value and that first-
party claims cost less to process than third-party claims. Therefore, a third-
party to first-party shift implies cost savings. However, no such difference in
costs appeared in the property damage data.
Hypothesis 3: That the amount of time required for processing
claims and receiving benefits will be shorter in a no-fault system
as compared to a tort system.
The data suggest that the amount of time elapsing between dates of
crashes and settlement dates of personal injury insurance claims was not
noticeably affected by no-fault. Furthermore, as to those claims that wound
up in court, no important diminution occurred in the amount of time elaps-
ing between the dates suits were filed and the dates of settlement. Never-
theless, one may not properly infer that no benefit in speedier claims
processing inured to personal injury victims. In fact, a marked diminution
in the amount of time elapsing between crash dates and dates of receipt of
first payments did occur, indicating that victims are more likely to receive
some recovery earlier, when their needs may be greatest.
In contrast, the time required to settle property damage claims actually
increased under no-fault and the time required to receive first payments
did not diminish.
Hypothesis 4: That the allocation of benefits in accordance with
ascertainable losses will be more equitable in a no-fault system
than in a tort system.
Personal injury insurance claims data under no-fault show that more
claims are settled in amounts much closer in value to verified medical
losses than in the superseded tort system. This suggests that the nuisance
value of relatively minor claims has been reduced, which arguably creates
a more equitable settlement process so far as these claims are concerned.
Whether severely injured victims are more adequately compensated under
the no-fault system cannot be decided from the data available in this study.
In contrast to the personal injury experience, property damage insurers
showed no tendency to pay insurance claims in amounts greater than veri-
fied damages under either no-fault or the superseded system. Therefore,
with respect to property damage claims, no-fault property damage repara-
tions appear to be no more equitable than was the tort system.
Hypothesis 5: That a no-fault system costs less to operate than a
tort system.
This hypothesis is phrased as it is because, from a political point of view,
costs and insurance rates are the factors that generate the most attention.
Nevertheless, this hypothesis is ambiguous until one clearly specifies the
goals sought by no-fault. Data obtained in this study suggest that three
[VOL. 9: 1
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changes occurred in connection with personal injury insurance rates and
benefits in the sample populations in the first two years of no-fault: (1) the
amount of premiums paid per registered vehicle diminished; (2) the amount
of benefits paid per registered vehicle increased; and (3) the ratio of bene-
fits to premiums increased. One may infer from these results that coverage
for personal injury benefits was expanded and that the cost of processing
claims was reduced. Different effects appeared in the property damage data:
(1) the amount of premiums paid per vehicle increased; (2) the benefits paid
per registered vehicle increased; and (3) the ratio of benefits to premiums
also increased, but only slightly. Hence, although coverage for property
-damage benefits did expand, the expansion was not accompanied by im-
portant reductions in processing costs.
Of special interest to lawyers is the fact that the proportion of insurance
claims that gave rise to litigation fell from about 9 percent in 1971 to about
2 percent in 1973. Lawyer participation in all personal injury settlements
fell from involvement in about 25 percent of the claims in 1971 to about 11
percent in 1973; however, their participation in third-party claims actually
increased from about 37 percent in 1971 to about 45 percent in 1973. A
strong shift from third-party to first-party claims, which have a much lower
lawyer involvement, accounted for the overall drop in lawyer participation.
In summary, the results of this study suggest that no-fault- systems such
as the Florida Reparations Reform Act can produce changes in the methods
by which reparations are made to injured victims of motor vehicle crashes
and in how much these benefits cost. Whether or not the changes detected
in the sample populations studied herein are beneficial is, of course, for the
political processes to determine. Whether or not one would want to rely
upon the results of this study alone to predict that similar results would
occur in other populations is a matter of judgment. At the very least, how-
ever, a methodology has been established that can be used in making more
extended tests in Florida or elsewhere.
This article discusses certain aspects of reparations systems that can be
described by statistical parameters, but it does not attempt to evaluate
whether or not pervasive sociological changes may result from legal modi-
fications of the concept of fault. It may be that any erosion of fault as a
legal concept will result in a decline in individual responsibility. The fact
that some members of the bar and some members of the medical profession
allegedly regularly engage in conspiracies to defeat the $1,000 medical
expense threshold of the Florida statute could be cited as evidence of such
deterioration. Nevertheless, this writer doubts that a cause-and-effect rela-
tionship exists between no-fault and the corruption of professionals. It is
more likely that the corruption of professionals helped to create the need
for no-fault and that the abuse of no-fault, if it exists, is merely the reasser-
tion of an underlying condition that has not been cured. No system should
be evaluated solely on the basis of abuses perpetrated by those who are
supposed to tend and nurture it. Sooner or later the professions must ef-
fectively police themselves and, if they do not do so, then the populace
should through the law.
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For convenience, the following report is divided into three parts. Part I
presents some historical and background material that introduces the suc-
ceeding more technical discussion. Readers well-informed about no-fault
may choose to skip this part. Part II contains data and analyses describing
some of the effects of no-fault which were felt in the courts. Finally, part
III contains similar information describing the effects of no-fault upon
the operation of the motor vehicle insurance claim payment system.
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
In the mid-1960's, no-fault automobile reparations became a. topic of
nationwide interest primarily through controversy stirred up by a proposal
for a Basic Protection Plan for the Traffic Victim' produced by Professors
Robert Keeton of Harvard University and Jeffrey O'Connell of the Univer-
sity of Illinois. The Keeton-O'Connell plan proposed a new accommoda-
tion among tort law, third-party liability insurance, and first-party insurance.
Tort liability for automobile crash claims is eliminated if the pain and
suffering damages would not exceed $5,000 and other tort damages would
not exceed $10,000, and compulsory first-party insurance for actual losses
up to $10,000 is added.2 Presumably, the great numbers of costly tort
claims whose value is less than these thresholds would be replaced by first-
party claims in the exact amount of compensable damages. Unlike third-
party tort actions, the first-party claims would be made against the insureds'
own insurance companies.
Massachusetts became the first state to adopt a law based upon the
Keeton-O'Connell plan when its no-fault statute3 took effect on January 1,
1971. Florida was the next to follow when the Florida Automobile
Reparations Reform Act 4 went into effect on the first day of the next calen-
dar year. Since that time, twenty-one more states have enacted some variant
of no-fault law, 5 not all of which are patterned as closely after the Keeton-
O'Connell plan as are the laws of Massachusetts and Florida. 6
The no-fault principle as it is embodied in any of these plans carries with
it certain basic assumptions that give it legitimacy and preference over the
1 R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965)
[hereinafter cited as BASIC PROTECTION].
2 Id. at 9.
:3 MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 34A et seq. (1975).
4 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 627.730-.741 (1974).
5As of September 1975, states may be placed in the no-fault categories as fol-
lows: Mandatory no-fault add-on to unchanged tort system: Delaware, Maryland,
Oregon, and Texas. Optional no-fault add-on to unchanged t'srt system: Arkansas,
Minnesota, South Dakota, and Virginia. No-fault with abrogation of tort liabil-
ity tip to thresholds: Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas,
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Nevada, Pennsylvania,
and Utah. Saskatchewan would fit under the first of the three categories and Puerto
Rico under the last.
6 Delaware, for example, enacted what is called an "add-on" no-fault provision.
Under this plan no-fault insurance is added on to the existing system without elim-
inating tort liability. For a complete description of the system and an evaluation of
its workings, see Clark & Waterson, "No-Fault" in Delaware, 6 RUTGERS-CAMDEN
L.J. 225 (1974).
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tort system. These assumptions include: (1) that the amount of litigation
arising out of automobile crashes will be reduced; (2) that the distribution
of personal injury claims arising out of motor vehicle crashes between third-
party and first-party modes will shift strongly toward first-party modes in
a no-fault system as compared to a tort system; (3) that the amount of time
required for processing claims and receiving benefits will be shorter in a
no-fault system as compared to a tort system; (4) that the allocation of
benefits in accordance with ascertainable losses will be more equitable in
a no-fault system than in a tort system; and (5) that a no-fault system will
cost less to operate than a tort system. The purpose of the study reported
herein is to test whether the Florida law has produced these desired changes
in the operation of Florida's automobile crash victim reparation system.
The reparations reform statute brought the following changes to Florida
law. Owners and registrants of certain classes 7 of motor vehicles, including
especially passenger automobiles, are required to pay reparations to per-
sons8 injured by a crash while occupying an insured vehicle without regard
to who was at fault in causing the crash or injury. This obligation of car
owners to make reparations to occupants is known as the Personal Injury
Protection obligation (PIP obligation).9 The no-fault PIP obligation in-
cludes coverage for medical, hospital and other health-related expenses,
and loss of earnings during disability up to a maximum aggregated PIP
liability of $5,000.10 No-fault payment for funeral expenses up to $1,000
also is included.'1 Florida law requires that these first-party obligations be
secured by appropriate insurance policies or other approved security
measures. 12 The law also mandates that liability insurance coverage be
provided. 13 So long as PIP obligations are properly secured, owners, regis-
trants, operators and occupants of insured vehicles are exempt from tort
liability for the economic consequences of bodily injuries suffered by a
person involved in a crash involving an insured vehicle up to the aggre-
gated total of $5,000 in payable PIP benefits, unless aggregated PIP medi-
cal benefits exceed $1,000 or death of the claimant or his permanent injury
ensues.' 4 Recovery for "pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience"
7 The principal class of covered motor vehicle is the passenger automobile. Cer-
tain classes are exempted from the no-fault reparations law including heavy trucks,
commercial vehicles, motorcycles, and vehicles not registered in the state. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 627.732(1) (1974).
8 Four classes of persons are entitled to PIP benefits. They are (1) owners of in-
sured vehicles while occupying the insured vehicle anywhere in the United States,
or while occupying any motor vehicle within Florida, or if, while a pedestrian
within Florida, hit by a motor vehicle; (2) certain relatives of owners of insured
vehicles who have the same protections as do owners unless covered as owners of
insured vehicles themselves; (3) other occupants of insured vehicles while within
Florida; and (4) Florida residents who are pedestrians hit by the insured vehicle within
Florida. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.736(4)(d) (1974).
9 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.736 (1974).
10 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.736(1) (1974).
1 1 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.736 (1)(c) (1974).
12 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.733(3) (1974).
13 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.733 (1974).
14 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.737(1) (1974).
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is abrogated unless one of the above three conditions prevails. 15 These con-
ditions are known as tort thresholds; if they are surpassed, the bar to tort
liability is removed. The Florida law also included no-fault property
damage provisions,'0 which are discussed in part III B below.
In summary, the following situation prevails under Florida's no-fault
law. A typical PIP claimant may recover up to $5,000 in no-fault benefits
on a first-party insurance claim without regard to who was at fault in caus-
ing the injury. If the claim does not exceed a tort threshold, then PIP
benefits are exclusive, with no remaining tort liability. If the claim exceeds
a tort threshold, then the claimant is entitled both to collect PIP benefits as
his expenses accrue and to bring suit in tort against an appropriate tort-
feasor. If a tort recovery were obtained, the insurer who made the PIP
payments would be entitled to reimbursement, 17 theoretically leaving the
successful tort claimant with a full tort recovery in addition to whatever
benefits accrued from having had the use of PIP monies as expenses were
incurred.
Briefly reviewing no-fault purposes,18 one may first say that no-fault PIP
coverage and the personal injury tort exemption were intended to limit
total recoveries to the amounts of proven PIP losses in cases where actual
losses fell below the $1,000 threshold. The effect should be to eliminate
15 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.737(2) (1974). As the law is enacted, the "pain and
suffering" tort exemption-threshold section reads as follows:
In any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator or
occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been
provided as required . . . or against any person or organization legally
responsible for his acts or omissions, a plaintiff may recover damages
in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience because
of bodily injury, sickness, or disease arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, operation, or use of such motor vehicle only in the
event that the benefits which are payable for such injury . . . or which
would be payable but for any exclusion deductible . . . exceeded one
thousand dollars or the injury or disease consists in whole or in part
of permanent disfigurement, a fracture to a weight-bearing bone, a
compound comminuted, displaced or compressed fracture, loss of a
body member, permanent injury within reasonable medical probability,
permanent loss of a bodily function, or death. Any person who is en-
titled to receive free medical and surgical benefits shall be deemed in
compliance with the requirements of this subsection upon a showing
that the medical treatment received has an equivalent value of at least
one thousand dollars. Any person receiving ordinary and necessary
services normally performed by a nurse from a relative or a member
of his household shall be entitled to include the reasonable value of
such services in meeting the requirements of this subsection.
Id.
In Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974), the Supreme Court
of Florida invalidated all thresholds except $1,000 medical expenses, death, and
permanent injury on grounds that the other classifications
cannot reasonably be said to rest on a rational basis but are clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, and for that reason this provision . . .
denies equal protection of the laws. ...
Id. at 21.
16 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.738(2) (1974).
17 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.736(3) (1974).
18 See generally BASIC PROTECTION, supra note 1.
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the nuisance value of small claims and thereby have them settled at lower
costs. Because in Florida a preponderance of pre-no-fault personal injury
claims were settled for amounts under $1,000 (even as inflated in pay-
ments),19 substantial savings to consumers, presumably in the form of
lowered premiums, should ensue. The savings should accrue both from
reduced payments and from lessened administrative costs. In addition, the
settlement of claims should be speeded up and fewer cases should make
their way into the courts. Second, no-fault should favorably affect benefits
received by victims whose injuries exceed the tort exemption threshold.
PIP-covered victims would recover up to $5,000 whether or not they were
at fault and whether or not the other party was at fault (subject to subroga-
tion if a tort recovery is obtained subsequently). Severely injured victims,
having the $5,000 PIP recovery to rely on, would be in a better bargaining
position with respect to a liability defendant and, presumably, could in-
crease the amount of recovery either through negotiation or trial. Crowded
dockets supposedly had coerced needy victims to accept less than adequate
settlements in many pre-no-fault cases involving severe injuries. (This latter
point has never been documented in Florida and in fact may not have been
prevalent in that state because its dockets move relatively quickly.) Thus,
no-fault was supposed to bring faster and more equitable settlement of
claims at a lower cost.
II. No-FAULT REPARATIONS IN THE COURTS
One purpose of this study was to examine the effect of the Automobile
Reparations Reform Act in the courts. It intended to assess the impact
upon the court machinery itself and upon the citizen-consumers of court
services. The experimental design called for only empirical data obtainable
from court records of litigated cases. No attempt was made to evaluate bud-
gets or other financial data or to engage in interviews with judges, clerks
or other court personnel.
The typical sequence of events in a suit arising out of an automobile
crash is: crash, filing suit, pleadings, trial, and judgment. The sequence can
be interrupted and halted at any point by settlement. The duration of the
time period between each step of the sequence is quite variable with no
definite upper limit, except between crash and filing suit which is limited
to four years for personal injury claims 20 and three years for property
damage claims arising before January 1, 1975, 21 and four years thereafter. 22
The other periods are apparently governed by the usual delays needed to
develop the cases, delays for tactical reasons, and delays stemming from
congestion in court calendars and inefficient administration. Advocates of
no-fault reparations systems have argued that no-fault recoveries will re-
move cases from court dockets, thereby alleviating congestion and allowing
I9 See Table 14 infra.
-aFLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(4) (1960), as amended, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(3)(a)
(Supp. 1975).
21 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(5)(c) (1960).
22 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(3)(h) (Supp. 1975).
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for speedier disposition of cases that are brought to court. Florida's $1,000
medical expense threshold presumably would operate to achieve that result.
This study was designed to determine two basic facts: (1) whether the num-
ber of automobile tort suits is reduced; and (2) whether measurable effects
on the duration of the time periods between the stages of the cases can be
discerned. Because the effects of congestion are not limited to automobile
tort cases, a complete study would cover all types of cases appearing in the
courts. Nevertheless, because of the resource limitations of this study, de-
tailed examination of court records was limited to automobile tort cases.
Court records of suits filed in the years 1969 through 1973 were selected
as the data sources for evaluation. Suits filed in 1971 and before represent
the pre-no-fault sample, suits filed in 1972 represent the no-fault transition
period, and suits filed in 1973 represent the stable no-fault period. In a
sense, however, none of these samples is a pure reflector of the intended
period. For example, some suits filed in 1971 represent crashes from an
earlier time (up to four years earlier for personal injury claims) and some
of them will remain in litigation well into the no-fault era. Similarly, suits
filed in 1972 and 1973 will include holdover cases from the pre-no-fault
era. Hence, all selected samples will be influenced to some extent by both
pre-no-fault and post-no-fault factors.
During the period of this study several changes were made in Florida
law that could independently affect the measurements being made, includ-
ing a fundamental restructuring of Florida's court system. Prior to January
1, 1973, Florida's trial courts were comprised of circuit courts of general
jurisdiction, 23 county courts with jurisdiction limited to demands not ex-
ceeding $500 in value in cases at law, 24 civil courts of record in counties of
population 450,000 or more2 5 with jurisdiction not to exceed $5,000,26 and
a miscellany of other subordinate courts. Preliminary records searches in-
dicated that very few, if any, (none were found) tort claims arising out of
automobile crashes, whether personal injury or property damage, were
filed in the county court in Alachua County, the situs of the court records
portion of this study. (Some Dade County data are also reported.) On Jan-
uary 1, 1973, a revised court structure became effective, abolishing all
courts inferior to circuit courts except the county courts.27 Owing to the
jurisdictional limits of the various courts, most personal injury litigation
would be expected to fall within the circuit courts' jurisdiction both before
and after the change. Unfortunately, this is not entirely true in counties of
450,000 population or more because some unknown number of personal
injury suits were filed in civil courts of record prior to their abolition on
January 1, 1973. As a consequence, the analysis of Dade County court
23 FLA. CONST. ANN. art. V, § 6(3).
2 4 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 34.01(1) (1961).
25 Ch. 21819, § 1, [1943] Fla. Laws Gen. 276 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 33.01
(1961)), (repealed Jan. 1, 1973).
26Ch. 11357, § 1, [1927] Fla. Laws Extra Sess. 45-46 (codified at FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 3302 (1961)) (repealed Jan. 1, 1973).
27 FLA. CONST. art. V, § 1. S.J. Res. 52-D, 1971, adopted 1972, created the judici-
ary article to the Florida constitution.
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filing practices was confounded, as shall be seen. Nevertheless, the changed
court structure is believed to have had little effect on the principal portions
of the study conducted in Alachua County, which never had a civil court
of record. Although the jurisdiction of the county court in Alachua
County was increased from $500 to $2,50028 in 1973, that change appears
to have had little if any impact upon filings of personal injury cases in
circuit courts. The only feasible automobile crash personal injury jurisdic-
tion of the county courts would be in suits exceeding a no-fault tort
threshold (or exempted suits) and not exceeding $2,500 in the ad damnum
claim.2 9 Presumably, such personal injury claimants would always demand
a sum in excess of $2,500, thus forcing the case into circuit court. In con-
trast, the $2,500 jurisdiction of county courts is sufficient to satisfy many
demands for property damages only. It also far exceeds the $550 threshold
that governed property damage claims up to the time the Florida Supreme
Court invalidated the property damage no-fault provisions.3" Since claims
involving only property damage often would not exceed $2,500, one would
expect most property damage claims to migrate to county courts. However,
this study shows that relatively few claims for property damage only were
ever filed in circuit courts. Prior to 1971, these claims made up about 3
percent of the tort filings in circuit court; in 1971 they rose to 7.5 percent;
and in 1972 and 1973 they fell to around 5.0 percent.3 ' Furthermore, on
July 11, 1973, the Florida Supreme Court, in Kluger v. White,3 2 invalidated
the property damage tort exemption, thereby in effect removing the
threshold entirely. While this decision restored the pre-no-fault litigation
potential for claims involving only property damage, the increased county
court jurisdictional amount should attract practically all such litigation
away from the circuit courts where personal injury claims are litigated.
One additional modification of the law during the course of the study
must be mentioned. In Lasky v. State Farm Insurance Co.a'3 the Florida
Supreme Court invalidated certain portions of the no-fault personal injury
threshold, leaving intact only a $1,000 threshold for medical expenses,
permanent injury, and death. Because several thresholds were dispensed
with (permanent disfigurement, a fracture to a weight bearing bone, a com-
pound, comminuted, displaced or compressed fracture, loss of a body mem-
ber, and permanent loss of a bodily function), 34 one would expect Lasky to
restrict further the number of suits being filed. The data requirements for
testing such a restriction far exceed the capabilities of this study. More-
28 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 34.01(1) (Supp. 1974).
'29 While it was not possible to make exhaustive studies of the county court cases.
a sample of 1974 cases indicated only about 2 percent of the cases filed in that
court involved automobile crashes and all of those cases involved only property
damage. (5,453 cases were filed in 1974. In the sample of the last 300 filings, seven
involved motor vehicle crashes.)
30 See text accompanying note 32 infra.
31 See Table C1 infra.
32281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
a1 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
24 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.737 (1974).
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over, since Lasky was decided relatively early in the life of the new law,3 5
it seems unlikely that many cases were affected.
The court-based portion of this study supplies information to help test
the following two of the several hypotheses set forth earlier:
Hypothesis 1: That no-fault will reduce the amount of litigation
arising out of automobile crashes in comparison to the tort
system.
and
Hypothesis 3: That the amount of time required for processing
claims and receiving benefits will be shorter in "a no-fault system
as compared to a tort system.
For convenience the following court study is divided into two sections,
one entitled Court Docket Study and the second entitled Court File Study.
The docket study is limited to an examination of the number of cases being
filed; the file study examines data from a large number of individual files.
Information obtained from the docket study pertains mainly to Hypothesis
1; whereas the file study pertains mainly to Hypothesis 3. Information from
the Insurance File Study 36 is used to augment the court data as appropriate.
A. Court Docket Study
The Court Docket Study includes an examination of court dockets for
years 1969 through 1974 in the circuit courts of Alachua and Dade Coun-
ties. Alachua County contains about 125,000 people and is located in north
central Florida. Dade County is the most populous county in the state,
exceeding a million inhabitants, and lies in the southeastern tip of the
peninsula. To an extent, therefore, these two courts represent small rural
and large urban populations respectively. This is not a totally accurate
representation, however, since Gainesville, the major north central Florida
town with an urban population of about 100,000 people, is located in
Alachua County. For that reason, the Alachua County courts may more
precisely represent small city populations.
To a large extent, an examination of various data counts can reveal use-
ful information about how the no-fault law is affecting the courts. Tables
C1 and C2 present data from both Alachua and Dade Counties for the
years 1969 through 1973. These data and statistics are explained in the fol-
lowing text.
Row 1, Civil Suits Filed, is a simple compilation of all civil suits of
any description whatever filed during the study years. Row 2, Motor
Vehicle Tort Suits Filed, is a compilation of all tort suits arising out of
motor vehicle crashes filed during the study years. The information in Rows
1 and 2 was obtained from court records.
Row 3, Percentage of Motor Vehicle Tort Suits to the Total Number of
Civil Suits, is computed by dividing the number of motor vehicle suits in
35 The case was decided on April 17, 1974, two years and four months after the
law went into effect. Rehearing was denied on May 28, 1974. 296 So. 2d at 9.
36 See part III infra.
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Effects of No-Fault in Florida
Row 2 by the total number of civil suits in Row 1. This ratio measures the
relative burden placed on the courts by motor vehicle suits. Note that this
relative burden varies only from about 10 percent to about 4 percent in
Alachua County, but soars to over 50 percent in Dade County for years
1969 through 1972. The change in the number of Dade County suits re-
flects the court reorganization of 1973, abolishing the civil court of records
and placing its cases in the circuit courts. Even with this discontinuity,
comparison between Dade and Alachua County data give a hint that Dade
County is a more litigious place. (If true, this could be the result of either
litigation-minded plaintiffs or refractory defendants.)
Data in Rows 4 and 5, obtained from the Florida Department of Public
Safety, indicate the number of registered passenger vehicles (Row 4) and
the number of crashes reported (Row 5) in each county and each year. In
a sense, these data represent gross litigation potential.
Row 6, Crashes Per 100 Registered Vehicles, is obtained by dividing
the numbers of crashes (Row 5) by the numbers of registered passenger
vehicles (Row 4). This parameter serves as a refined measure of litigation
potential. Note that it is the most stable quantity in the table, varying only
between a low of 6.9 in Alachua County and a high of 8.5 in Dade County
over all the years in question.
Row 7, Suits Per 100 Crashes, is obtained by dividing the number of
motor vehicle tort suits in a given year (Row 2) by the average of the num-
ber of crashes reported in the preceding and current years. The average
number of crashes for the two years, rather than simply the number of
crashes in the current year, was selected for this analysis because the
median delay between suit and crash exceeded one-half year in all years
except 1969. Thus, the number of suits filed in a given year is affected
strongly by both the current and preceding year. To some extent, this
parameter measures the litigiousness of the crash populations. Detected
changes in it that are associated with the introduction of the no-fault law
would suggest some connection between no-fault and the proclivity of crash
victims to bring suit. The trends established in Row 7 suggest that some
change may be in the making. Note also that the Dade County crash popu-
lation appears to produce more than twice as much litigation per crash as
does the Alachua County crash population.
Post-1971 trends in the number of motor vehicle suits (Row 2) and the
number of suits per 100 crashes (Row 7) signal a reduction in the amount
of litigation. This in turn suggests that no-fault does reduce litigation. On
closer inspection, however, it is apparent that 1971 was itself an unusual
year, particularly in Alachua County, in that the number of suits took a
leap above the immediately preceding years. An explanation for this could
be that uncertainties about the consequences of the impending no-fault law
caused lawyers to file suits in the latter half of 1971 (the last pre-no-fault
year) that ordinarily would not have been filed before 1972. Since the no-
fault bill was passed in the 1971 spring session of the Florida Legislature
(filed in the office of the Secretary of State on June 24, 1971), 3 7 there was
37 Ch. 71-252, [1971] Fla. Laws Gen. 1355, 1371.
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enough time for lawyers to file pending cases ahead of the January 1, 1972,
effective date of the new law. Consequently, the reduction in cases in 1972
and 1973 could indicate no more than that cases ordinarily expected to be
filed then had been filed earlier. In an attempt to account for this early suit
possibility, the parameters in Rows 8 through 12 were generated.
Rows 8 through 12 can be explained as follows. If there were only a
redistribution of law suits among years 1971 through 1973 and no real
change in the numbers being filed, then the total number filed during those
three years ought to be the same as the total number that would have oc-
curred had the no-fault law not passed. If, on the other hand, a real
decrease in the number of suits was experienced, then the total number of
law suits filed during the three years ought to be less than the number that
would have been projected upon continuation of past trends. The number
of suits that would have been produced by such a continuation was estimated
as follows. First, the number of suits per 100 crashes (as defined for Row
7 above) was computed for 1969 and 1970 and then the average for the
two years was taken. This average is the parameter that establishes the
assumed stable pre-no-fault trend. Next, this 1969-70 value was multiplied
by the average of the number of crashes in the current and preceding years
for each year after 1970 to obtain the expected number of suits shown in
Row 8. Then, this expected number of suits was subtracted from the actual
number of suits (Row 2) to produce a parameter called Excess Suits shown
in Row 9. This parameter indicates the change in number of suits each year
compared to the number that would have been expected based upon pre-
no-fault experience. As can be seen, both Alachua County and Dade County
experienced an anticipatory jump in 1971 and each experienced a sizeable
decrease in 1972, the first year of the no-fault era. Note that fewer than
the expected number of suits continued to be filed in Alachua County in
1973 and 1974, whereas the opposite trend appeared in Dade County.
Unfortunately for this study, the Dade County Civil Court of Record
formerly having jurisdiction of damage suits up to $5,000 was abolished
effective January 1, 1973,38 throwing its cases into circuit court. Whether or
not this transfer accounts for the reversal of expectations in the Dade
County circuit courts in 1973 and 1974 cannot be told from available
data.
The analysis may be extended to average out the effects of the anticipat-
ing jump in suits as follows. First, the parameters Excess Suits (Row 9) and
Expected Suits (Row 8) were accumulated over the years beginning with
1971 and placed in Rows 10 and 11 respectively. Next, the parameter
Percent Deviation was computed by dividing accumulated excess suits by
accumulated expected number of suits to produce a parameter measuring
cumulative deviation from cumulative expectations. This parameter is dis-
played in Row 12. As can be seen, the 1971 anticipation in Alachua County
was associated with about a one-fourth rise in suits over expectations. The
total effect of this jump had not been erased by the end of the first no-fault
year (1972), but by the end of the third no-fault year (1974), net long term
38 See notes 23-29 and accompanying text supra.
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deviation appears to be stabilizing at about 15 percent fewer suits than
would have been expected without no-fault. The Dade County data showed
a similar pattern through 1972 but with a much less extreme jump in 1971.
This perhaps suggests that the Dade County lawyers were at that time more
sophisticated in their knowledge about the impending no-fault law than
were Alachua County lawyers. As pointed out above, the Dade County data
for 1973 and 1974 are not comparable to those of the earlier years because
of the 1973 change in court structure.
Tables Cl and C2 and the textual explanation of them demonstrate the
association between the introduction of no-fault and changes in the number
of cases being filed in Alachua and Dade Counties. General comments may
be helpful. First, lawyers in both areas seemed to anticipate the new law
by filing suits in 1971 earlier than they ordinarily would have, presumably
because of uncertainties about the effects of the new law on the right to
sue.3 9 Data on time lapses between crash dates and suit dates corroborate
this "speeding up" in 1971, which had the effect of increasing the number
of motor vehicle tort suits filed in 1971 (Row 2), increasing the relative
court burden imposed by them (Row 3), and increasing the number of suits
per 100 crashes in Alachua County (Row 7). All of these effects were more
strongly felt in Alachua County than in Dade County. In 1972 and 1973
the number of suits diminished rapidly (Row 3) in Alachua County, produc-
ing the opposite effect from that seen in 1971. While a reduction of suits
occurred in Dade County in 1972, the effect of abolishing the civil court
of record confounded the analysis thereafter. Because the effects in the
latter two years could have been produced either by a real change in litiga-
tion practices or by delayed consequences of early suits in 1971, a routine
for comparing the actual amount of litigation in 1972 and 1973 with the
amount that would have been expected had the no-fault law not occurred
was developed (Rows 8 through 12). This analysis suggests that the intro-
duction of no-fault was associated with a genuine decrease in litigation
culminating in about 15 percent fewer Alachua County suits in the aggre-
gate for years 1971 through 1973 than would otherwise have been
expected (Row 12).
That the number of motor vehicle tort suits appears to be diminishing
compared to what would have been expected in the absence of the no-fault
law also can be inferred from data obtained from insurance files. In a total
sample of 1291 claims, the proportion of personal injury claims that was
settled or otherwise disposed of without suit increased from 91.6 percent
in 1971 to 94.8 percent in 1972 and to 96.6 percent in 1973. In a smaller
sample of more serious claims, the respective percentages ranged from 93.8
39 Interestingly enough, the same phenomenon seemed not to occur or to be
less pronounced with the introduction of Delaware's no-fault law. Clark & Water-
son, "No-Fault" in Delaware, 6 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 225, 232 (1974) (especially
Table I). Two factors might account for the difference. One is that the Delaware
statute of limitations is two years instead of Florida's four, thereby reducing the
opportunity for early filing. The other is that Delaware's law does not have a tort
exemption. Hence, there may have been less apprehension among members of
the bar.
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percent in 1971 to 95.0 percent in 1972 and to 93.5 percent in 1973. This
principally reflects a marked supplanting of third-party claims with first-
party claims that is clearly shown in the analysis of the insurance claim
data. Of the much smaller numbers of more serious injuries that gave rise
to third-party tort claims, the proportions that end up in suit actually in-
creased. From the larger sample, the percentage of third-party insurance
claims that resulted in suits rose from 10.7 percent in 1971 to 14.3 percent
in 1972 and to 39.3 percent in 1973. In the smaller sample, suits in third-
party insurance claims rose from 9.3 percent in 1971 to 23.3 percent in
1972 and to 32.7 percent in 1973. Because of the great decrease in third-
party insurance claims, however, the actual number of suits decreased by
about 50 percent, tending to corroborate the trends being established in
the Alachua County circuit courts. 40
This analysis suggests that no-fault does reduce the amount of litigation
arising out of automobile crashes in comparison to the tort system. Quanti-
fying the extent and importance of the change in terms of how effectively
the courts are able to perform their functions would require a study
extending over more years and data of a kind different from that available
herein.
B. Court Files Study
The preceding section showed that the Florida no-fault law appears to be
reducing the number of law suits stemming from motor vehicle crashes. In
a sense, it concentrated upon the courts as an institution. This section
attempts to measure some of the effects felt by the litigant-consumers of
the services provided. In obtaining information for this part of the study,
the court records of all of the closed suits arising out of motor vehicle
litigation filed in the Alachua County circuit courts in the years 1969
through 1973 were individually examined. 41
A preliminary question asked of the files was what causes of action are
alleged in suits involving motor vehicle crashes. Presumably, most pre-no-
fault suits would involve third-party actions of one kind or another and the
data gave no surprises on this score. In each year a majority of the claim-
ants alleged negligence as the cause of action, with only a sprinkling of
survival and wrongful death actions. Of more significance is the fact that
of 169 cases filed in Alachua County circuit courts in 1972 and 1973, only
40 A more positive statement cannot be made since a fairly sizeable number of
insurance claims remained unsettled when the data gathering phase of this project
was completed. While adjustments could be made for certain analyses in the insurance
portion of this paper, the statistics presented here were computed on the un-
adjusted data.
41 A sample of suits filed in the Dade County circuit courts was also selected for
examination. Sampling was necessary because of resource limitations. The sample
selected was composed of all the suits assigned to one specific judge. This particular
sample was selected because the judge's personal filing system was so organized as to
facilitate greatly the research work. While such a sample has a potential for bias if
the particular judge's trial practices were to vary importantly from the norm, never-
theless, having it available made it possible to obtain some measure of the Dade
County situation. Unfortunately, due to this judge's death and other difficulties the
1973 data have not been obtained.
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two were in the nature of suits against a no-fault insurer. Hence, it appears
that no appreciable volume of contractual claims against no-fault carriers
is springing up to replace the missing tort actions.
TABLE C3
DISTRIBUTION OF DAMAGE ALLEGATIONS
ALACHUA COUNTY SUITS
[Numbers represent percentages of total claims filed.]
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Personal Injury Only 49.5 52.0 45.6 53.4 74.2
Property Damage Only 3.3 2.9 7.5 5.8 4.8
Personal Injury &
Property Damage 44.0 41.2 38.8 26.2 14.5
Survival & Wrongful Death 3.3 3.9 8.2 14.6 6.5
n= (93) (102) (147) (103) (62)
As was expected, most motor vehicle suits involved personal injuries
either as the sole claim or in conjunction with a property damage claim.
How the cases were distributed over various types is shown in Table C3.
While the number of cases is too small to draw firm conclusions, it appears
that a significant change has occurred in the proportion of suits that join
claims for both personal injury and property damage (these decreasing
from 44 percent in 1969 to 14.5 percent in 1973) and suits involving only
property damage (jumping in 1971 and subsiding to about twice pre-1971
levels in 1972 and 1973). Although the reasons for these changes are not
certain, the following explanation can be offered. Most claims joining per-
sonal injuries and property damage would involve occupants who were also
the owners of the damaged car. Nonowners would not be asking for prop-
erty damages and nonoccupants would not be asking for personal injury
damages. In connection with crashes occurring after January 1, 1972, the
tort threshold would cut out some injury claims, leaving only a property
damage claim for which there has been no threshold since mid-1973. 42
Furthermore, most property damage claims would drop out of the circuit
courts because of the $2,500 jurisdictional minimum. The net effect of
these changes could produce the varied distributions seen in the data. In
any event, it is important to note that the cases involving only property
damage do not constitute a major portion of the litigation. One ancillary
observation that might be made is that the litigable issues in property dam-
age cases normally would involve fault and not damages, whereas personal
injury cases would be more likely to involve both fault and damages or
damages only. Hence, claims involving only property damage are not likely
to be as demanding of the courts' time and resources as are personal injury
cases.
Because court files were found to be unreliable as sources of information
about damages suffered and payments made, the speed of processing claims
was the only direct impact on consumers that could be measured with some
42 See Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
FALL 1975]
Journal of Law Reform
degree of confidence from data contained in the court files. The bar graphs
in Figures C1 through C4 depict median values of relevant time lapses
experienced in Alachua County lawsuits. The median value, the value for
which one-half of the individual measurements are larger and one-half
smaller, is less sensitive to extreme values than is the arithmetic average
value (the mean). Because some cases filed in each year were still unsettled
when data were last gathered, the median of the cases that are settled
represents the true median of all the cases better, than does the mean and
therefore has been used as the pictorial parameter. Under each bar graph
is placed the mean (in parentheses) and the number of cases in the sample.
Medians and means are measured in days.
Figure C1
TIME ELAPSED: DATE OF CRASH TO DATE SUIT FILED
337
265
230
Median (days) 200
147
Year 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Mean (days) 239 416 296 320 430
No. of cases 85 99 135 95 56
Figure Cl depicts the amount of time elapsing between the date of crash
and the date suit was filed. The only upper constraint on this measurement
is the four-year statute of limitations on negligence actions. 43 Combining
all the data from all years into one population showed that one-half of the
motor vehicle crash suits were filed within about eight months and only 12
percent remain to be filed after two years. The bar graphs are inconclusive,
but suggest a definite trend toward lengthening the median value of this
delay beginning in 1971. Note that the apparent increase in delay between
crash date and suit date occurred at the same time that a- marked decrease
in numbers of suits being filed -occurred. Several factors could be at play.
43 See note 20 supra.
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One is that the 1971 statistic was artificially shortened by early suit filing
behavior in anticipation of the law's coming into effect. Another could be
that no-fault is working as promised by weeding out minor cases that were
always filed relatively quickly and leaving the more serious cases that liti-
gants can now develop more slowly with the support of PIP benefits. Other
than these inferential time lapse data, however, no data are available to
substantiate that supposition.
Figure C2
TIME ELAPSED: SUIT DATE TO ANSWER DATE
25 26 25 25 26
Median (days)
Year. 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Mean (days) 51 33 38 42 33
No. of cases 74 84 115 80 52
Figure C2 depicts the amount of time lapsing between suit dates and
answer dates; this remained practically constant across the years in ques-
tion. Perhaps it is informative that the median and means of these values
regularly exceed the maximum period of twenty days permitted by the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. 44 This suggests either that motions of one
kind or the other are often interposed 45 or that courts regularly extend this
limit. If the latter is true, it also suggests that the workload of the courts
might be lightened by extending the prescribed period to thirty days and
then stringently adhering to it absent unusual circumstances.
The time lapses between crash dates and the dates that the trial began,
and between suit dates and trial dates, were also measured. So many suits
were settled prior to trial, however, that too few were left in the Alachua
44 FLA. R. Civ. PRO. 1.140(a).
45 The filing of a proper motion suspends the answer date until ten days "after
notice of the court's action." Id.
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County samples to produce reliable statistics descriptive of these measure-
ments.
Whether or not settlement practices were modified by the no-fault law
also has some bearing on the effectiveness of the act. Table C4 depicts the
distribution of the suits according to various time-of-settlement categories.
Lumping all the suits from all study years into one sample shows that set-
tlements fall into three main groups. Between 10 and 20 percent of the
suits are settled after suit is filed and before an answer is made. About
one-half are settled after answer but before a trial date is set and about 20
percent are settled after a trial date is set but before trial. Only about 10
percent actually go to trial and reach judgment. While there is some vari-
ability in the data across the years, no particularly meaningful trend is dis-
cerned unless it is that fewer cases after no-fault are settled prior to an
answer having been filed. This would be consistent with the supposition
that many nuisance value cases have been dropped out of court by no-fault,
leaving a preponderance of more serious cases.
TABLE C4
TIME-OF-SETTLEMENT CATEGORIES
ALACHUA COUNTY SUITS
[Numbers represent percentages of the total
number of settlements.]
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Before Answer 17.6 14.9 14.3 12.1 9.7
Before Trial Date Set 53.8 47.5 39.5 57.9 59.7
After Trial Date Set 22.0 26.7 34.7 19.6 21.0
At Judgment 6.6 10.9 11.6 10.3 9.7
n-- (91) (101) (147) (107) (62)
Once suit is filed, there appears to be no discernible change in the
amount of time it takes to reach settlement through whatever processes are
involved. Lumping all the data from all years into one population showed
that about 50 percent of the cases were settled within nine months after suit
was filed in the Alachua County courts and only 3.8 percent remained
unsettled after two years in court. The bar graphs of Figure C3 show no
important change over the years.
Figure C4 depicts the total amount of time lapsing in lawsuits between
crash dates and settlement dates. Combining all the data from all years
into one population showed that about 40 percent of the cases were settled
by the end of one year in court and that about 27 percent remained un-
settled at the end of two years. While there was some variation from
year-to-year, no trend that could be attributed to no-fault appeared to be
in the making.
How members of the Florida bar were accommodating to the tort
exemption thresholds in pleading cases was a matter of incidental interest
to the study. In Alachua County in 1972, the pleadings in about one-third
of the cases to which the law applied contained clear allegations that
thresholds had been surpassed. In two instances, defendants had pleaded
[VOL. 9: 1
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Figure C3
TIME ELAPSED: SUIT DATE TO SETTLEMENT DATE
235
Median (days) 198 215U ,,,m m
Year 1969
Mean (days) 297
No. of Cases 86
TIME ELAPSED:DATE OF
1970 1971 1972 1973
316 236 249 246
99 136 97 58
Figure C4
CRASH TO DATE OF SETTLEMENT
Median (days)
Year
Mean (days)
No. of Cases
1969 1970
525 733
87 99
1971 1972 1973
530 558 659
135 97 58
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thresholds as affirmative defenses, leading to amended complaints. By 1973
the incidence of affirmatively alleging the surpassing of thresholds had
dropped to less than 10 percent, all of these being in amended complaints.
The conclusion to be drawn from this seems to be that the thresholds are
being treated as matters of affirmative defenses and therefore waivable if
not pleaded in the answer. While there is no reported litigation on the issue,
the correct rule would seem to be that the thresholds are matters that may
be raised in defense at any time before judgment, or even on appeal if the
courts were to treat them as pertaining to subject matter jurisdiction.
Another incidental aspect of Florida trial practice is that a liability insur-
ance company may be named as a party defendant. This aspect of Florida's
jurisprudence runs contrary to normal rules in tort cases and stems from a
series of judicial innovations beginning with Shingleton v. Bussey46 in 1969
and carrying forward to O'Hern v. Donald47 in 1973. Stated in basic con-
tract law nomenclature, these holdings classify injured crash victims as
intended beneficiaries of liability insurance contracts, who, as such, have
the right to sue liability insurance companies directly. O'Hern carried the
development to the extent of stating flatly that proceeds obtained in suits
brought against insurance companies for excess liability over policy limits
(for tortiously refusing settlement within limits) are payable to the injured
party, no matter in whose name the suit is brought.48
Beginning with Shingleton in 1969, the frequency with which insurance-
companies were named as defendants in Alachua County suits advanced as
follows: 28 percent (1969); 61 percent (1970); 72 percent (1971); 81
percent (1972); and 66 percent (1973). Because it is apparent on the face
of these statistics that plaintiffs' lawyers have found joining insurers to be
a useful trial practice, there is no simple explanation for the reduction in
1973. It could be as follows. Every crash population involves some number
of insured and uninsured vehicles. No-fault thresholds bar suits in crashes
involving many insured vehicles, but if a motorist is uninsured for any rea-
son, he will not be protected by thresholds.49 Hence, the thresholds elimi-
nate some portion of the population of insured defendants but eliminate
none of the uninsured defendants. Consequently, a smaller proportion of
46223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
47 278 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1973). It is worth noting that in conversation with the
author, insurance company representatives generally expressed the belief that the
Shingleton and O'Hern decisions were more damaging to their interests than was the
enactment of the no-fault law.
48 278 So. 2d at 259.
49 Uninsured motorists would fall into two categories: those who are required
to provide security under the Act and have not (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.733 (1974),
and those who are not required to provide security. The latter group includes most
visitors from other states, owners of commercial vehicles, and owners of motor-
cycles. As to the former uninsured group, the Act explicitly states that there "shall
be no immunity from tort liability." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.733(4) (1974). Owners
in this group are also made personally liable for payment of PIP benefits. Id. As to
the latter uninsured group, the tort exemption never applies. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 627.737(1) (1974). Those owners also are not liable for the payment of PIP
benefits.
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the suits remaining under the no-fault law involve insured defendants and
proportionately fewer insurance companies are available to be joined.
III. No-FAULT REPARATIONS IN THE
INSURANCE CLAIMS SYSTEM
A. Personal Injury Claims
While a typical trial lawyer's conception of the automobile crash repara-
tion system is likely to be influenced only by suits that come into the legal
system for resolution, such a view is exceedingly narrow insofar as Florida
experience goes both before and after the introduction of the Automobile
Reparations Reform Act. Data from the insurance claim study show that
about 75 percent of all insurance claims were settled without lawyer in-
volvement in 1971, the last pre-no-fault year, and that this nonlawyer
involvement advanced to about 85 percent in 1972 and to about 89 percent
in 1973. While lawyer involvement per claim of all types fell off as indi-
cated, the involvement of lawyers in bodily injury liability claims increased
from 36.9 percent in 1971 to 45.7 percent in 1972 and 44.2 percent in
1973. Concomitantly, lawyer involvement in first-party claims decreased
from 11.1 percent in 1971 to 8.6 percent in 1972 and to 5.8 percent in
1973. Because of a shift from third-party to first-party claims, overall
lawyer involvement per claim diminished. Furthermore, the frequency of
the filing of lawsuits also diminished-about 9.4 percent in 1971, to 3 per-
cent in 1972 and to 2 percent in 1973.
Therefore, a complete picture of the operation of the reparation system
is to be obtained from an examination of the insurance claims system and
not merely from examining those few claims that arrive in lawyers' offices
or the even fewer that wind up in court. To be totally comprehensive, one
would need also to look at injuries for which no insurance claims are ever
made, but such an undertaking was beyond the capabilities of this study. 50
In preparation for presenting various analyses, the data samples and
sampling methodology will first be described. Two insurance companies
allowed their settled claims files to be used as data sources for the study. In
each case the companies left experimental design, file selection, and file
examination entirely to the researchers. The general experimental design
called for selecting a sample of crashes that occurred in 1971 (the last pre-
no-fault year) to represent the pre-no-fault situation, a sample of crashes
that occurred in 1972 (the first no-fault year) to represent the transition
period, and a sample of crashes that occurred in 1973 to represent the
stable no-fault period. One of the companies was a relatively large insurer
in the state and the other relatively small. The project was not able to ex-
amine every claim made against either of the companies during the three
year period. Accordingly, the following sampling procedure was developed.
50 The Council on Law-Related Studies also sponsored a study of the Massachu-
setts no-fault law that may shed some light on the subject. The study by Professor
Alan I. Widiss of the University of Iowa is to be published in 1975 or 1976.
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From the smaller company, every claim file opened in respect to crashes
that occurred during February and March for each of the three years was
selected as part of the sample. For the larger company, every claim file
opened in a single designated regional office in respect to crashes that oc-
curred during the same two months was selected. Owing to the difference
in size of the companies, the sizes of the two samples are about equal.
Once a particular claim file was identified as a member of a study sub-
sample, every individual claim within the file became a part of the study.
For example, a single file could have one or more third-party personal
injury claims, orie or more first-party personal injury claims, and one or
more property damage claims. Once the file was selected all the claims
would be coded into the study.
Because crashes occurring in a two month period are used to represent
a twelve-month phenomenon, how representative these samples are of the
total crash population may be asked. Nothing known to the researcher
suggests that February and March differ significantly from the remainder
of the year. These particular months were selected with several goals in
mind, one being to facilitate the completion of the study. The earlier in the
respective years the crashes occurred, the sooner the claims would be set-
tled and the sooner the results of this study would be available. A second
reason was that these months are somewhat representative of the two
seasons of Florida: the winter tourist season by the February data and the
remainder of the year by the March data. A second question of repre-
sentation arises because samples are used to represent the entire state's per-
formance. On this point it should be observed that the state-wide sample
is distributed among the counties in rough approximation to the population
distribution.51 On the other hand, the regional sample is very strongly in-
51 Comparative distributions across the ten most populous Florida counties and
the unscreened claims population are shown below:
Percentage of Percentage of
Population Unscreened
Distribution Claim
by County Population
(estimated by
County 1974)1 County
Dade 17.1 5.0
Broward 10.0 2.2
Pinellas 7.9 1.5
Hillsborough 7.1 4.3
Duval 6.9 41.4
Palm Beach 5.6 2.0
Orange 5.1 3.4
Brevard 3.0 0.6
Escambia 2.7 1.4
Volusia 2.5 1.5
68.0 63.3
1 DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, STATE OF FLORIDA, FLORIDA
ESTIMATES OF POPULATION JULY 1, 1974, STATE, COUNTIES AND MU-
NICIPALITIES (1974).
Although the unscreened claim population is strongly skewed toward the Jackson-
ville experience in Duval County and slightly toward the less populous counties,
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fluenced by the population concentration in Jacksonville and Duval County.
Analyses from this regional sample showed few marked differences between
it and the state-wide sample, so one may infer that the regional sample is a
fair reflection of state-wide experience. Unfortunately, not enough data are
available to make extensive county-by-county comparisons. Consequently,
the insurance claims files data do not reflect the unusual practices that are
said to exist in Dade County. 52
When initial analyses were made of the data collected in the samples
described above, it was found that the percentage of personal injury claims
was so small that the number needed to be augmented in order to have a
sufficient sample to describe relatively serious crashes. Accordingly, new
samples were drawn following the format described above, except that the
time frame was extended to cover crashes occurring in the months of
February through May in each of the three years and files were selected
only if they contained at least one personal injury claim on which payments
totalling $200 or more had been made. Once a closed file was selected
under this modified procedure, all personal injury claims therein were
coded, and all property damage claims were ignored. Hereinafter the orig-
inal samples are referred to as the "unscreened" sample to indicate that
there was no screening out of small claims, and the second samples are
referred to as the "screened" samples to indicate that they are skewed
toward more severe personal injury claims by the exclusion of many claims
that were settled for amounts less than $200. Although separate analyses
have been run on the data collected from each company, the data and
statistics presented herein derive from samples created by merging the data
from the two. This makes for economy in presentation and was done only
after it was determined that the trends established in the merged samples
do not differ in kind from the trends established in the individual samples.
Reference will be made both to the unscreened and the screened samples
as necessary and appropriate.
Several steps have been taken to eliminate data that would unnecessarily
confound the comparisons between no-fault and pre-no-fault experiences.
One such step was the removal from the analyses of cases to which the no-
fault law did not apply in the 1972 and 1973 crashes or would not have
applied had the law been in effect in the 1971 crashes. This removed claims
involving occupants of out-of-state and commercial vehicles. Another step
was to remove claims in which some payment for property damage was
included in the personal injury payment. A third step was to remove claims
in which more than one claimant was compensated in a single payment.
Unless stated otherwise, all of the data and statistics represent samples that
have been filtered in this way. While this study contains data from more
it should be borne in mind that it is composed of two subpopulations, one drawn
state-wide and the other mainly from the Jacksonville area. The component state-
wide claim population is distributed much closer to the state-wide individual popu-
lation and the trends established by analyzing that data alone corroborate the
trends established in the unscreened population. Consequently, the unscreened claim
population appears to be reasonably representative of the state-wide experience.
52 See discussion of Rows 3 and 7 of Tables CI and C2 supra.
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than 2,000 personal injury claims, the reader should be cautioned not to
overgeneralize the results of the various analyses that will be presented. The
study contains a great many variables, such as different crash years and
different claim modes, and, since the data are subdivided for comparative
analyses, the subsample sizes often become small. When this happens, the
representative character of the results can be questioned. In order that the
reader will be aware of the need for caution, subsample sizes are stated in
all tables and figures. The nomenclature "n=xxx," where "xxx" indicates
the number of cases in the particular subsample, is used throughout.
The insurance claims data and analyses will now be used to test some of
the hypotheses set forth earlier.
Hypothesis 2: That the distribution of personal injury claims
arising out of motor vehicle crashes between third-party and first-
party modes will shift strongly toward first-party modes in a
no-fault system.
Given the revised structure of the Florida law, the question is not
whether such a shift would occur but rather how large the shift would be.
Data and statistics in Tables I1 through 13 allow for a close estimation of
the size of the shift. If uninsured motorists' claims are placed in the third-
party category and the remaining unsettled cases are apportioned to third-
party and first-party categories in the same proportions as the settled cases
are apportioned, then the insurance data (Table I1) show a transfer from
about a 60 percent third-party to 40 percent first-party split in 1971 to
about a 20 percent third-party to 80 percent first-party split in 1973.
TABLE I1
DISTRIBUTION OF INSURANCE CLAIMS AMONG
THIRD-PARTY, FIRST-PARTY AND OTHER MODES
1971 1972 1973
Total Personal Injury Claims 418 455 471
(100%) (100%) (100%)
Third-Party Claims 235 118 70
(56.2%) (25.9%) (14.8%)
First-Party Claims (Med. Pay, PIP) 164 323 326
(39.2%) (70.9%) (69.2%)
Uninsured Motorists & Others 13 6 10
(3.1%) (1.3%) (2.1%)
Unsettled & Unclassified 6 8 65
(1.4%) (1.8%) (13.8%)
Related to the change in distribution of claims is the effect that the no-
fault law has had on the insurance-buying practices of the motoring popu-
lace. Assuming that the portion of the population that is involved in crashes
is representative of the total insurance-buying population, one may examine
these buying practices from data available in the insurance claims samples.
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It should be borne in mind that these data exclude persons who fail to buy
any insurance since they are not reflected as policy holders in the insurance
files. Of the insurance policies against which claims in this study were filed
during the three years, 0.2 percent had no bodily injury liability coverage,
49 percent had 10-20 coverage, about 11 percent had 25-50 coverage, 9
percent had 50-100 coverage, 12 percent had 100-300 coverage, 0.4 per-
cent had 300-500 coverage, and about 19 percent fell into some other
category.5 3 No important change was noted among the individual distribu-
tions for the three years of the study. In contrast, a marked difference in
first-party insurance buying habits has occurred as the statistics in Table 12
show. The proportion of insurance buyers that chose not to purchase any
first-party protection fell from 16.2 percent in 1971 to 2.1 percent in 1972
and to 2.4 percent in 1973. This change was expected since the no-fault
law mandated the purchase of PIP first-party coverage for a large portion of
the Florida motoring public. What may be noteworthy is that about 75
percent of the insured motorists purchased both PIP and medical payment
coverage in 1972 and 1973, thus giving them first-party protection beyond
that required under the law.
TABLE 12
DISTRIBUTION OF FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE COVERAGES
[Numbers represent percentages of total.]
1971 1972 1973
None 16.2 2.1 2.4
Med. Pay 83.7 1.9 3.6
PIP N.A. 21.8 17.3
PIP & Med. Pay N.A. 74.2 76.7
n= (1120) (1680) (1506)
As is the case in most states, Florida law authorizes insurance companies
to make insurance available at special rates to motorists "who are in good
faith entitled to but who are unable to procure such insurance through
ordinary methods. ' '54 Drivers commonly fall into such an assigned risk plan
because of a prior unlawful or dangerous driving experience. An examina-
tion of the data underlying Table 12 indicates that the proportion of drivers
falling into the assigned risk category increased from just under 10 percent
in 1971 to about 20 percent in 1972 and to slightly less than 18 percent in
1973. Although data in this study do not in themselves explain this
increase, it may simply represent the decrease in numbers of motorists who
were uninsured in 1971.
Perhaps a more useful way to gauge the shift in the distribution of claims
from third-party to first-party modes is to examine the number of claims
53 The meaning of the coverage categories is as follows. The first number in-
dicates the amount of personal injury liability coverage (in thousands of dollars)
provided in respect to a single injured person and the second number indicates the
amount of personal injury liability coverage provided in respect to all injuries in
a single crash. Thus, 10-20 coverage provides liability protection in an amount up
to $10,000 for a single injury and up to a total of $20,000 in a single crash. Liability
for claims exceeding those limits is uninsured.
54 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.351(1) (1974).
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per crash of the respective types. Because it was not feasible to trace claims
from particular crashes, it was not possible to obtain a direct measure in
this manner from these data. Nevertheless, a representative parameter was
devised that allows for comparisons across years even though it does not
give an absolute measure of claims per crash. This representative parameter
is obtained by dividing the number of claims in each of the three unscreened
files (Table 11) by the number5 5 of motor vehicle crashes reported in the
state in the three respective years. 56 To avoid confusing these ratios with
the actual number of claims per crash, the ratio computed for each year
was normalized to the ratio computed for the 197.1 data. The value of this
is to allow the reader to concentrate on the changes occurring in the
various parameters rather than to concentrate on size alone. 57 If only closed
claims are included in the calculations, the numbers shown under part A
of Table 13 are generated. If the unsettled claims in Table I1 are allocated
between first-party and third-party modes in the same proportions as set-
tled claims in the 1972 sample are distributed, then the numbers in part B
of Table 13 are generated. It can be seen from these statistics that the total
number of personal injury claims per crash remained relatively stable,
although a slight reduction occurred in 1973. Nevertheless, both parts A
and B demonstrate a substantial shift from first-party to third-party claims,
thus corroborating the results of Table I1 in a slightly different way.
TABLE 13
RATIOS OF PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS PER REPORTED CRASH
[Normalized to 1971 total claim figure.]
1971 1972 1973
A. Closed Claims
Total Claims per Crash 1.00 0.99 0.76
Third-Party Claims per Crash 0.60 0.28 0.15
First-Party Claims per Crash 0.40 0.72 0.61
B. All Claims*
Total Claims per Crash 1.00 1.00 0.86
Third-Party Claims per Crash 0.60 0.28 0.19
First-Party Claims per Crash 0.40 0.72 0.67
*The sixty-five unclosed claims were allocated between third-party and first-party
modes in the same proportion as closed 1972 claims.
55 The data in Table I1 and Table 14 include all claims and not just those from
crashes subject to the no-fault law. Later analyses apply only to the portion of the
claims to which the no-fault law is applicable or would have been for 1971 data had
the law been in effect.
56 Reported Florida crashes for years 1971 through 1973 were 249,227; 272,479;
and 325,237 respectively. Figures obtained courtesy of the Florida Department of
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles.
57 For example, if numbers of claims in a three-year period were 1,150; 1,285; and
1,407, there appears to be a change but the size of the value tends to underplay it.
If instead the data are normalized to the value of the first year by dividing each
number by 1,150, then the series becomes 1, 1.12, and 1.22. The new series shows
at a glance that the second and third years exceeded the first by 12 percent and
22 percent respectively. The normalizing technique is useful where the amount of
change is important but the absolute sizes of measurements are not, as here.
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In summary, it is apparent that Florida's no-fault law has led to a sub-
stantial shift away from third-party liability claims and to first-party
contractual claims, at least in the population of claims in this study. If the
costs of dispensing first-party money are indeed less than those of dispens-
ing third-party money, as this study suggests, this shift should represent
either a net gain to the beneficiaries or a net savings to premium payers or
both.
Hypothesis 3: That the amount of time required for processing
claims and receiving benefits will be shorter in a no-fault system
as compared to a tort system.
Three parameters were generated to measure processing times. They are:
TC = Amount of time (in days) elapsing between the date of the
crash and the date a claim was filed with the insurance
company.
TF = Amount of time (in days) elapsing between the date a
claim was filed and the date the first payments were made
to the claimant.
TS = Amount of time (in days) elapsing between the date the
claim was filed and the date the claim was settled.
FigureIl
TF-TIME ELAPSED: PERSONAL INJURY CLAIM TO FIRST PAYMENT
Unscreened Sample
1971 1972 1973
1403
Median 118.0
(days)
639.0
27.3 L 2 .
26. 23.0 2.
3d P 1st P all 3d P lst P all 3d P 1st P all
Mean(days) 100.8 52.5 78.6 156.9 36.7 52.0 119.6 34.0 39.3
No. of cases 137 128 275 35 251 292 19 281 307
In the figures are displayed three bars depicting each of the three parameters
defined above. The first bar represents the population of third-party claims,
the second bar represents the population of first-party claims, and the third
bar represents the population of all the claims obtained by merging these
two subpopulations. The median value is depicted by the bars because that
statistic is less sensitive to uncertainties stemming from the unsettled cases
than is the mean value. Means and numbers of cases in each sample are
stated beneath the bars and data depicting both unscreened and screened
population samples are presented. (It should be recalled that the unscreened
sample purports to represent the population of all personal injury claims,
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Figure 12
TS - TIME ELAPSED: PERSONAL INJURY CLAIM TO SETTLEMENT
Unscreened Sample
Median 69.4
(days) j
3d P
Mean(days) 23.2
No. of cases 141
1st P
90.0
130
all 3d P 1st P all
105.6 177.8 87.5 990
281 39 263 308
3d P lst P all
206.4 92.3 103.7
24 286 317
whereas the screened sample is skewed toward more serious injuries be-
cause a selected claim file had to have at least one claim for which payments
of $200 or more were made. Third-party claims are those made under
bodily injury liability coverage, whereas first-party claims are those made
under medical payments and PIP coverages.)
No-fault has been associated with a slight diminution in the amount of
time taken to file claims for both third-party and first-party modes in both
the unscreened and screened populations. In general, the mean filing time
Figure 13
TS -TIME ELAPSED: PERSONAL INJURY
Screened Sample
1971
CLAIM TO SETTLEMENT
1972 1973
Median
(days)
3d P
Mean (days) 140.0
No. of cases 252
1st P all
118.5 131.8
181 441
3d P 1st P all 3dP lst P all
196.8 130.7 142.9 212.4 151.7 191.1
48 270 324 54 238 305
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is more than one week and less than two weeks, as is shown in Table 14A.
One deviation from a rather uniform trend is to be seen in the 1973
screened sample, which suggests that an increase in time to file third-party
claims occurred. A slight downward movement in time to file first-party
claims is consistent with the no-fault law's requirement that legitimate PIP
losses be paid as they accrue.58 Coupled with the shift from third-party
to first-party claims, this provides some overall reduction in filing times.
Data in this study indicate that, in general, beneficiaries are receiving
first payments slightly sooner after the filing of a claim than they were be-
fore the no-fault law became effective. Figure 12 shows that the delay in
receiving a first payment diminished in both the first-party and all claims
subpopulations of the unscreened population. The reverse trend is true for
third-party claims; under no-fault it takes longer than before for liability
claimants to receive the first payment. This, too, was consistent with ex-
pectations. The no-fault tort exemption shifted all of the minor third-party
claims over to first-party modes, leaving only the more serious claims in
the third-party mode. Since these claims are more costly to insurers, they
are more likely to be disputed on various legal grounds. Accordingly, work-
ing out settlements takes longer on the average than before. It should be
borne in mind, however, that these third-party claimants should now be
receiving PIP benefits under first-party coverages while they are awaiting
settlement of the third-party claims. (That the trends depicted in Figure
I1 for the unscreened population also appeared in the screened population
can be seen from data in Table 14B.)
TABLE 14B
TF - TIME TO RECEIVE FIRST PERSONAL INJURY
PAYMENT [SCREENED POPULATION]
Third-Party Claims First-Party Claims
1971 1972 1973 1971 1972 1973
Median (days) 83.5 102.5 136.5 37.3 25.3 29.1
Mean (days) 117.2 145.9 133.9 68.0 44.4 50.0
n (248) (47) (52) (177) (257) (231)
All Claims
1971 1972 1973
Median (days) 57.9 29.7 34.8
Mean (days) 95.3 62.5 69.4
n = (431) (309) (295)
Interestingly enough, the time taken to settle claims in all subpopulations
increased between pre-no-fault 1971 and no-fault 1973. This phenomenon,
depicted in Figures 12 and 13, shows that before no-fault was introduced
the time taken to settle was substantially greater in the screened population
than in the unscreened population. It was to be expected that third-party
58 The no-fault law provides that "Benefits due from an insurer ... shall be ...
due and payable as loss accrues, upon receipt of reasonable proof of such loss.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.736(4) (1974).
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settlement times would increase for the same reason that times to receive
first payments on third-party claims increased, but the slight lengthening
of settlement time in the first-party mode does seem unusual. It is perhaps
explained by a more relaxed attitude about the need to settle on the part
of first-party insurers, especially since the no-fault law gives first-party
insurers a right of subrogation to third-party recoveries made by bene-
ficiaries. 59
Owing to the change in the pattern of claim modes, it is difficult to con-
clude from these analyses that claimants are better or worse off under no-
fault than before with regard to speed of claims and processing. Neverthe-
less, on balance the speeding up of the receipt of first payments appears
to be a favorable result for claimants.
Hypothesis 4: That the allocation of benefits in accordance with
ascertainable losses will be more equitable in a no-fault system
than in a tort system.
While it would be desirable to gauge the equity in the competing
reparation systems, equity cannot be measured solely by statistics describ-
ing insurance payments made to injured victims. Such a determination
would also require knowledge of the extent of harm done and the extent
to which it had been ameliorated by the benefits received. Because knowl-
edge about harm done and needs could not be obtained in this study, the
following discussion must necessarily be restricted to benefit payments
made.
Data and analyses are presented for both unscreened and screened sub-
samples and for first-party and third-party recovery modes. By observing
the allocation of numbers of cases between the recovery modes, particularly
in the unscreened subsample, the reader may note again the switch from
the third-party to the first-party mode that already has been seen.
To facilitate the analyses, several new variables are defined as follows:
Verified Medical Expense = Total amount of medical expense
claimed as verified by documentation in the insurance claim
file.
Total Personal Injury Payment = Total amount of the payment
made to the claimant in settlement of a claim as verified by
documentation in the insurance claim file.
Extra Value = The difference between the total payment made to
the claimant and the verified medical expenses. It represents
the amount by which the settlement exceeded verified medical
expenses.
R = The ratio obtained by dividing the Total Personal Injury
Payment by Verified Medical Expenses. R shows the multiplier
effect between these two parameters.
Total Personal Injury Payment measures the.total amount of insurance
payments being made to injured victims of motor vehicle crashes. Observ-
59 The Florida law provides for subrogation reimbursement after a third-party
settlement has been made or judgment received by the first-party claimant. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 627.736(3) (1974). For a commentary on how this procedure works
under the Florida law, see Note, Insurer's Rights of Reimbursement Under Florida's
No-Fault Law, 26 FLA. L. REV. 534 (1974).
FALL 19751
Journal of Law Reform
ing any changes in the distribution and size of this variable would allow
one to make a determination as to whether the introduction of no-fault has
been associated with any overall changes in patterns and sizes of payments.
Verified Medical Expense represents ascertainable out-of-pocket losses
associated with the injury. It was initially intended to include a variable
to measure wage losses, but this quantity was not found to be regularly
and reliably stated in insurance claim files. Insurers are more confident
using medical costs as the gauge of the true value of a claim. Hence, Verified
Medical Expense, representing documented medical expenses, is used as a
gauge of injury severity. Extra Value, the difference between the two fore-
going variables, in a sense represents the value of the claim in excess of the
verified medical payments. If there is any nuisance value component in a
total payment, it will show up in this variable. Note, however, that the mere
existence of a positive Extra Value does not assure that the total payment
exceeds some actual measure of true worth of the claim. Also included
within it would be wage and other monetary losses plus whatever sum might
represent the value of the pain, suffering and inconvenience experienced by
the claimant. The fourth variable, R, represents a factor by which one
would multiply Verified Medical Expenses to estimate the settlement worth
of a personal injury claim.
TABLE 14
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS OF TOTAL PERSONAL INJURY
PAYMENTS [UNSCREENED POPULATION]
1971 1972
$0 to $500 64.8 63.7
$500 to $999 10.4 9.7
$1,000 to $2,000 14.8 10.0
$2,000 & above 10.0 16.6
n = (298) (320)
1973
70.2
9.0
5.1
15.6
(332)
The Total Personal Injury Payment distributions for the unscreened
population are shown in Table 14. Associated with the no-fault years of
1972 and 1973 is a trend toward greater proportions of cases in the pay-
ment brackets of $500 and below and $2,000 and above. The intermediate
brackets of $500 to $999 and $1,000 to $2,000 had proportionately fewer
cases. The shift to greater payments for more serious injuries is clearly seen
in the total payments distribution for the screened population (Table 15).
TABLE 15
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS OF TOTAL PERSONAL
INJURY PAYMENTS [SCREENED POPULATION]
1971 1972
$0 to $500 41.9 38.4
$500 to $999 16.3 16.9
$1,000 to $2,000 21.1 16.9
$2,000 & above 20.7 27.7
n = (473) (354)
1973
28.8
17.1
16.2
37.9
(309)
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Note particularly the increase in the proportion of claims paid in
amounts over $2,000 in 1973. These trends represent the type of change
that would correct overpayments to minor claims and underpayments to
severe claims, and suggest that no-fault is indeed correcting these inequities.
Nevertheless, that such an explanation accounts for the changes cannot be
definitely asserted from these data. It can be said, however, that this re-
distribution is associated with the shift from third-party claims.
Tables 16 through 19 summarize the four variables defined above as they
have been computed for various populations. In these tables the designation
All Claims is used to represent the population of claims produced by merg-
ing the first-party and third-party claims into a single population. Further-
more, the presentations in Tables 18 and 19, displaying the total payment-
to-medical expense ratio [R] have further divided the claim populations
into those for which Total Personal Injury Payment was less than $1,000
and those for which it was greater than $1,000 and have also presented R
for the parent population produced by merging the first-party and third-
party claim populations.
A perusal of Tables 16 and 17 clearly shows the switch from third-party
to first-party recovery modes. It also shows increases in Verified Medical
Payments, Total Personal Injury Payments and Extra Value between 1971
third-party claims and those of later years. This was an expected conse-
quence of the tort threshold's removal of many claims from the third-party
mode..60 The same general trend may be noted in the first-party payment
data. In the first-party claims the increase in Total Personal Injury Payment
is presumably attributable in part to general advances in the costs of medi-
cal services and supplies6' and in part to the fact that first-party PIP bene-
fits under the no-fault law may include wage losses and the costs of ancil-
lary services6 2 that were not ordinarily compensable under pre-no-fault
60 After Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974), the remaining
thresholds are: $1,000 or more in medical losses; death; and permanent injury.
Presumably, the post-1971 third-party payments under $1,000 reflect permanent
injuries.
61 It may be that the increase in the mean of the Verified Medical Expense vari-
able represents the increase in basic costs of medical services. If so the screened popu-
lation of the Verified Medical Expense data shows an increas2- in the ratio from I to
1.23 and to 1.37 for years 1971 to 1973 respectively.
62 Benefits payable under the no-fault law are:
(a) Medical benefits-All reasonable expenses for necessary medical,
surgical, x-ray, dental and rehabilitative services, including prosthetic
devices, and necessary ambulance, hospital, and nursing services. Such
benefits shall also include necessary remedial treatment and services
recognized and permitted under the laws of the state for an injured
person who relies upon spiritual means through prayer alone for
healing, in accordance with his religious beliefs.
(b) Disability benefits-One hundred percent of any loss of gross in-
come and loss of earning capacity per individual, unless such benefits
are deemed not includable in gross income for federal income tax pur-
poses, in which event such benefits shall be limited to 85 percent, from
inability to work proximately caused by the injury sustained by the
injured person, plus all expenses reasonably incurred in obtaining
from others ordinary and necessary services in lieu of those that, but
for the injury, the injured person would have performed without
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medical payments insurance coverages. The latter fact may also explain
the increases in the Extra Value variable in the first-party populations. Note
that while the mean value of this parameter is not zero in any first-party
population, the median value of Verified Medical Expense is zero or close
to it in all first-party populations. This indicates that a very large proportion
of first-party claims is settled in the exact amount of verified medical pay-
ments. The same economy is not a characteristic of the third-party popu-
lations.
Comparisons among the values of the total payment-to-medical expense
ratio [R], arrayed in Tables 18 and 19, highlight the relative economy of
the first-party recovery mode. The tables show that the median of this
variable is 1.0 or very near to it for every first-party subpopulation in both
the unscreened and screened populations. This means that about one-half
of all first-party claims is paid in amounts greater than the amount of
verified medical payments and about one-half in amounts less. In contrast,
the mean value of R for first-party began at about 1.0 for the 1971 pre-
no-fault first-party claims and increased somewhat under no-fault. While
this increase is seen both in the unscreened and screened populations
(Tables 18 and 19 respectively), it is accentuated in the more seriously in-
jured augmented population and in the claims of greater than $1,000 in
the unscreened population. Presumably, this increase reflects the extended
scope of losses covered under no-fault PIP insurance as compared with
pre-no-fault medical payments insurance.
Even though wage losses and costs of certain other ancillary services are
paid, no-fault PIP payments are not made for pain, suffering, and incon-
venience. It is, of course, such quantities which are hard to prove and
measure that give third-party claims their speculative value. One readily
discerns this quality by comparing the sizes of the total payments-to-
medical expense ratio [R] for third-party claims in Tables 18 and 19 to the
sizes of R for first-party claims. The sizes of the median values of R for
third-party claims are about four times those of their first-party counterparts
and the mean values range from two to four times as large as the first-party
mean values. These statistics suggest that a given injury, as measured by
verified medical expenses, will be compensated from two to four times as
much on the average under the third-party recovery mode as under the
first-party mode.
These data and analyses have suggested that economy can be achieved
by shifting personal injury claims from the third-party to the first-party
mode, and that such a shift has occurred in Florida. The distribution of
claims by total amounts paid (Table 14) also suggests that a greater per-
centage of claims now falls in each of the brackets of $500 and under, and
$2,000 and above. If this indicates a trend away from overpayment of
income for the benefit of his household. All disability benefits payable
under this provision shall be paid not less than every two weeks.
(c) Funeral, burial or cremation benefits-Funeral, burial, or crema-
tion expenses in an amount not to exceed one thousand dollars per
individual.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.736(1) (1974).
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Effects of No-Fault in Florida
minor claims and underpayment of severe claims, then no-fault is producing
some of its promised equitable benefits. The general advance in the average
size of the total payments-to-medical expense ratio [R] suggests that no-
fault first-party claimants are being more adequately compensated for lost
wages and ancillary services than were pre-no-fault first-party claimants.
Presumably, little, if any, "nuisance value" has crept into these payments.
At the same time, the mean value of R in the screened population dropped
from 6.7 in 1971, to 4.9 in 1972, and then to 4.0 in 1973, suggesting that
the relative magnitude of compensation for losses other than medical
expenses is decreasing in third-party recoveries. Data in Table 17 show,
however, that the absolute sizes of the mean values of both Verified Medical
Expense and Total Personal Injury Payment have advanced markedly,
giving a 1973 Extra Value of more than twice the 1971 value. Contrary to
decreases seen in the size of R, this suggests that those claims which remain
in the third-party mode are more adequately compensated than before.
Hypothesis 5: That a no-fault system will cost less to operate
than a tort system.
Cost may be defined to mean several different things. One definition of
cost might be the amount of money paid into the reparation system by
purchasers of insurance policies; another might be the amount of money
paid out to recipients of insurance settlements; and a third might be the
ratio of the first two, representing a measure of the administrative cost
efficiency of the transfer of money from premium payers to injured bene-
ficiaries. Because each of these measures produces valuable information,
all are used in the following analysis. To make meaningful year-to-year
comparisons, the measurements have been normalized 63 to some invariate
quantity.
While the most cogent means of making comparisons would be on the
basis of costs per motor vehicle crash, it is possible that the reported
number of motor vehicle crashes per actual crash might itself vary as a
consequence of the introduction of no-fault, thereby artificially skewing
some parts of the analyses. 64 Thus, to avoid possible error, the number of
registered passenger motor vehicles 65 has been used as the normalizing
parameter in the analyses that follow. It may be noted that parallel
computations using reported vehicle crashes were made, producing trends
that are totally consistent with those seen in the data and statistics presented
herein.
To make this analysis, three new parameters were defined: premium paid
per vehicle; benefits paid per vehicle; and ratio of benefits to premiums
[B/P ratio]. If information describing all premiums and benefits paid per
year in the state were available, the parameter "premiums paid per
vehicle" would be computed by summing all premiums paid under the no-
63 See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
64 See text accompanying note 53 supra.
65 According to the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles,
the total number of passenger vehicles registered in Florida for years 1971 through
1973 were respectively: 5,360,493; 5,933,501; and 6,382,298.
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fault law (or paid in 1971 by motorists who would have been subject to
the no-fault law had it been in effect that year) and dividing that sum by
the number of vehicles registered to the motorists who paid the premiums.
The trend in the premiums-paid parameter would establish whether the
insurance costs per vehicle advanced or declined under the new law. The
parameter "benefits paid per vehicle" would be computed similarly. Trends
in the benefits-paid parameter would establish whether the no-fault law
was associated with increasing or decreasing costs in terms of benefit pay-
ments. Finally, the benefits-to-premiums [B/P] ratio would be computed
by dividing benefits by premiums. Trends in this parameter would indicate
whether the reparations system was associated with greater or lesser
efficiency in transferring money from premium payers to beneficiaries. A
higher ratio would indicate the expenditure of proportionately less money
in administrating the transfer.
Unfortunately, total amounts of benefits paid for the entire state of
Florida are not available in this study. Nevertheless, data that are available
may be used to estimate values for the parameters for each year in question.
These estimates are made in the sections that follow. The reader should be
aware that the samples from which the estimates are drawn are relatively
small in some cases. For that reason the conclusions must be viewed as
tentative and with caution.
Premiums Paid-In the absence of data describing the total amount
of money paid for motor vehicle insurance by Florida motorists during the
study years, a surrogate measure was devised as follows. First, profiles
were developed for two motorists that would be assumed to be typical of
the Florida motoring population insofar as their insurance costs were af-
fected by the no-fault law. The selection of the profile criteria was judg-
mental and not empirical. Those criteria were stated as follows:
Driver A: Male; married; 35 years of age; one insured vehicle;
no drivers under age 25; no prior crashes or convictions; 1970
Chevrolet Caprice, four-door, airconditioned and automatic
transmission.
Driver B: Identical to A except for one at-fault crash creating
$1,000 in personal injury liability during the preceding twelve
months.
Second, because insurance prices vary from place to place, Jacksonville
and Miami were selected as study areas under the assumption that they
typified all areas of the state insofar as insurance costs were affected by the
no-fault law. Third, an insurance package was specified as follows:
Liability: $10,000 per injury/$20,000 total personal injuries per
crash/$10,000 property damage per crash.
Medical Payments: $1,000.
PIP: $5,000 (Applicable only in 1972 and 1973.)
Collision: $50 deductible and comprehensive.
Basic Property Protection: (Applicable only in 1972 and part of
1973 because of the invalidation of the property damage tort
exemption in 1973.)
Next, prices that would have been charged to drivers fitting the stated
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profiles in the two areas were obtained from the two participating insurance
companies for each year from 1971 through 1973. Finally, the costs of the
bodily injury insurance were averaged for the two companies, divided by
the number of passenger motor vehicles registered in the state in each of
the three study years, and normalized to 1971 costs. (Treating separately
the data from the individual companies creates the same trends as are seen
in the totaled data, so for economy in presentation, only the totaled data
are used.) The normalized relative bodily injury insurance costs for Jack-
sonville and Miami are displayed in Table 110, showing identical decreas-
ing trends in premium costs for 1971 through 1973.66
TABLE 110
RATIO OF COST OF BODILY INJURY
INSURANCE PACKAGES TO 1971 COST
Miami Area
1971 1972 1973
Bodily Injury Insurance Cost 1 0.88 0.85
Jacksonville Area
1971 1972 1973
Bodily Injury Insurance Cost 1 0.88 0.85
In summary, it appears from these data that the cost of bodily injury in-
surance per registered passenger vehicle diminished with the introduction of
the no-fault law in Florida. 67 It is perhaps noteworthy that this apparent
reduction occurred during a period when the trends in number of claims per
registered passenger vehicle68 and in the cost of medical services apparently
were increasing.69 It should also be noted, as will be demonstrated in part
III B, that the property damage insurance costs per registered vehicle also
were increasing during this period.
Benefits Paid-While the total amount of money paid out in benefits
66The initial insurance rate reductions did not necessarily reflect any gain in
economy. The no-fault law itself mandated an immediate 15 percent rate reduction
"calculated as a percentage of the combined financial responsibility rate . . . in
effect at the time of the filing of the new rates required herein." FLA. S'iAT. ANN.
§ 627.741(2)(a) (1974). The financial responsibility law requires only liability in-
surance ($10,000 per injury/$20,000 two or more injuries per crash/$5,000 property
damage per crash). FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 324.151(a), 324.021(7) (1968). Therefore,
no overall rate reduction was necessarily forthcoming in a complete insurance pack-
age that includes first-party coverages as did the insurance packages used in this
study. Financial responsibility limits were changed to $15,000/$30,000/$5,000, ef-
fective July 1, 1975. Ch. 73-180, §§ 1, 2, [1973] Fla. Laws Gen. 366, amending FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 324.021 (1968). That change does not affect the data in this study.
O7Comparative 1974 and 1975 figures to those in Table 110 were respectively 1.04
and 1.09 for Miami and 0.96 and 1.00 for Jacksonville. As this paper is being pre-
pared, Florida automobile insurance companies are seeking raises of about 20 per-
cent. It should be observed, however, that this comes at a time when medical mal-
practice insurance costs are skyrocketing, and when Florida workmen's compensation
insurance companies are seeking rate hikes, citing advancing medical costs as the
reason. Gainesville Sun, Sept. 12, 1975, § B, col. 1.
68 See Table 112 infra.
69 See discussion of Table 113 inlra.
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during the study years is not available, a surrogate can be developed from
the claims in the unscreened population, as follows. First, the claims for
each year were divided into first-party and third-party categories to gene-
rate the distribution shown in Table It 1.70
TABLE Ill
ADJUSTED CLAIMS DISTRIBUTIONS*
1971 1972 1973
Total Personal Injury Claims 291 320 369
Third-Party Claims 153 44 33
First-Party Claims 138 276 336
*These represent claims to which the no-fault law applied in 1972 and 1973 or
would have applied in 1971, include no property component, and involve a single
claimant.
Next the figures in Table IIl were divided by the number of Florida
passenger vehicles registered in each year 71 to produce a surrogate number
of claims per registered vehicle. Because resulting numbers may be used
only for internal comparisons, they have been normalized to a common
factor and presented in Table 112.
It should be pointed out that the trends seen in Table 112 can only be
asserted with confidence to represent the populations in Table Ill. In
TABLE 112
FREQUENCY OF CLAIMS PER REGISTERED
PASSENGER VEHICLE
1971 1972 1973
Total Personal Injury Claims 1.00 1.01 1.11
Third-Party Claims 0.53 0.14 1.10
First-Party Claims 0.47 0.87 1.01
70As shown in Table II there were six, eight, and sixty-five unsettled cases re-
spectively in years 1971, 1972 and 1973. In order to minimize skewing the results,
particularly in the 1973 data, an accounting had to be made of these cases both
from the point of view of whether the no-fault law applied to them and from
the point of view as to whether they were first-party or third-party claims. The
1971 and 1972 data showed that about 70 percent of the cases each year were under
no-fault and the remainder were not. Hence, 70 percent of the unsettled cases for
each year were arbitrarily assigned to augment the unscreened sample as shown in
Table Ill. Next the newly assigned cases were allocated to first-party and third-
party modes, as were the settled cases. The 1971 claims were distributed in ac-
cordance with the allocation of 1971 settled claims and the 1972 and 1973 claims
were distributed in accordance with the allocation of 1972 settled claims. The 1973
unsettled claims were allocated according to 1972 allocations of settled claims in
an attempt to avoid erroneous skewing away from third-party cases in 1973. The
assumption was that 1973 unsettled cases were more likely to be third-party than
first-party claims and that the 1972 and 1973 distributions should be nearly iden-
tical. Following this procedure, two unsettled cases were assigned to each settle-
ment mode in the 1971 sample; one case to third-party and five to first-party in
1972; and six cases to third-party and thirty-nine to first-party in 1973. These num-
bers were incorporated into Table Ill.
71 See note 65 supra.
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that population, the total number of claims per registered vehicle was rising
from a relative value of 1.0 in 1971, to 1.01 in 1972, and to 1.11 in 1973.
An increase, however, was to be expected since the percentage of insured
motorists that carried first-party insurance had risen from 83.8 percent in
1971 to over 97 percent in 1972 and 1973. This, coupled with the fact that
fault is not an issue in first-party recoveries, should have made more in-
jured persons eligible for a recovery in -the latter two years. Hence, the
trends depicted in Table 112 are consistent with expectations.
The second and third rows of Table 112 show the division of the claims
between first-party and third-party modes. The sum of the numbers in these
columns equals the value in the first row for all personal injury claims.
These data show that the relative frequency of third-party claims per regis-
tered vehicle decreased by a factor of four or five while the relative
frequency of third-party claims per registered vehicle increased by a factor
of slightly greater than two. Hence, Table 112 clearly shows the no-fault
switchover from third-party to first-party claims.
By extending the data farther, surrogate relative measures for benefits
paid per vehicle can be produced. These are obtained by multiplying the
TABLE 113
RATIO: BENEFITS PAID PER 1972 AND 1973
REGISTERED PASSENGER VEHICLE TO 1971
[Numbers are in dollars.]
E.
C. Ratio:
Surrogate D. Surrogate
B. TOTPAY Surrogate TOTPAY
A. Mean Claim TOTPAY Per
Claims TOTPAY* Per Per Vehicle
Per Per Vehicle Vehicle to 1971
Vehicle Claim (A x B) C(l) + C(2) Figure
1971
Third-Party 0.53 1321 700(1)
1971
First-Party 0.47 593 279(2) 979 1.0
1972
Third-Party 0.14 3749 525(1)
1972
First-Party 0.87 770 670(2) 1195 1.22
1973
Third-Party 0.10 5444 544(1)
1973
First-Party 1.01 734 741(2) 1285 1.31
*TOTPAY Total Personal Injury Payments
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relative numbers of first-party and third-party claims per vehicle for each
year (data from Table 111 placed in Column A of Table 113) by the mean
values of total payments made to first-party and third-party claimants in
the unscreened populations in the respective years (data from Table 16
placed in Column B of Table 112). This computation produces a surrogate
total payment per claim type per registered vehicle for each year (Column
C, Table 112). Adding the first-party and third-party figures produces a
surrogate total payment per registered vehicle for each year (Column D,
Table 113). Finally, normalized surrogate measures of benefits paid per
crash are produced by dividing this final sum produced for each year by
the 1971 sum (Column E, Table 113).
It can be concluded from data in the first row of Table 112 and in
Column E of Table 113 that, for claims included in the unscreened popu-
lations in this study, the number of claims per registered vehicle increased
by about 11 percent between 1971 and 1973, and that the amount of
benefits paid per registered vehicle increased by about 31 percent during
the same period. This suggests that more people are receiving benefits in
greater amounts under no-fault, thereby creating a more costly system.
Such a conclusion may be erroneous for two reasons. One is that the cost
of medical services advanced markedly during the three year period. This
increase can be estimated by dividing the 1973 Verified Medical Expense
by the corresponding 1971 value which produces a ratio of 1.52. This
indicates about a 50 percent increase in medical costs. 72 Presumably in-
creases would have occurred with or without no-fault. A second factor
that suggests that no-fault may have held down total payments is the change
in the value of the total payments-to-medical expense ratio [R] between
1971 and 1973. Data from the unscreened population in Table 18 show a
drop from 2.9 in 1971 to 1.9 in 1973, representing a reduction of 34
percent.
For a complete analysis one needs to know what would have happened
to the amount of money paid out in benefits had the no-fault law not been
enacted. Such a finding would require examining the trends in a control
population which was not affected by the no-fault law. While it would be
possible to obtain a control non-no-fault sample from claims arising out
of crashes involving commercial vehicles and out-of-state vehicles, not
enough data from no-fault-exempt claims were obtained in this study to
make valid comparisons. Nevertheless, one can generate a representative
cost per vehicle measure for motorists exempted from the no-fault law by
making several assumptions that allow use of the available data. Let it be
assumed that without no-fault the 1971 distribution between first-party
and third-party recovery modes would have held constant in succeeding
years; that the number of claims per registered vehicle would not have
increased; that medical costs would have increased; and that the value of
the R would have held constant at 2.9. Calculations based upon these
assumptions produce a non-no-fault 1973 representative total payments
72 See Table 16 supra.
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per registered vehicle value of $1,385. Dividing this by the comparable
1971 quantity73 produces a normalized measure of 1.42, representing a 41
percent increase over 1971. Using this analysis, one can argue that the no-
fault law, while paying benefits to about 11 percent more claimants, held
the increase in total amount of payments in the unscreened sample to
31 percent, instead of the 41 percent increase that would have occurred
otherwise.
Summary-Having derived these representative numbers for the pre-
mium costs (Table 110) and benefits paid (Table 113) per registered
passenger vehicle, one may now arrange the premiums paid per vehicle,
benefits paid per vehicle, and the benefits-to-premiums [B/P] ratios in a
matrix, as below:
MATRIX A
1971 1972 1973
Premium Paid Per Registered Vehicle 1 0.88 0.85
Benefits Paid Per Registered Vehicle 1 1.22 1.31
B/P Ratio 1 1.39 1.56
With respect to the particular population of claims under study, several
important inferences can be drawn from this matrix. First, the premium cost
per registered vehicle decreased for the first two years of no-fault. Second,
the benefits paid per registered vehicle increased. Finally, the benefits-to-
premium ratio increased markedly during the same period. To these may
be added the earlier finding that the number of claims per registered vehicle
also increased, 74 thereby spreading the benefits paid over a larger popula-
tion of injured victims. To the extent that the sample population is repre-
sentative of the entire state these findings reflect the performance of no-
fault in Florida. They suggest that the hypothesis of more cost-effectiveness
with no-fault should be accepted.
B. Property Damage Claims
Unlike the Keeton-O'Connell plan,75 other no-fault proposals, 76 and the
forerunner law in Massachusetts,7 7 the Florida Automobile Reparations
Reform Act included property damage as well as personal injury within its
no-fault provisions.7 8 Before the no-fault law was enacted, motor vehicle
insurance purchasers had the options of purchasing contracts to cover
third-party liability in respect to property damage caused to other people,
to cover crash damage to the motorists' own motor vehicles regardless of
fault, or to cover incidental damage. As an alternative the motorists could
remain uninsured. The first-party coverage is commonly called "collision
coverage" and typically is sold with deductibles of $50 and $100.
73 The 1971 quantity is 979. See Column D of Table 113 supra.
74 See Table 112 supra.
75 See BASIC PROTECTION, supra note 1.
76 See notes 2-5 supra.
77 See note 3 supra.
78 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.738 (1974), ruled unconstitutional in Kluger v. White,
281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
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Under the Florida no-fault property damage law, Florida owners and
registrants of passenger vehicles were required to purchase property damage
liability insurance [PDL]70 and to exercise one of three options as to first-
party property. damage coverage: they could purchase collision coverage
[COLL] that would pay regardless of fault ;80 they could purchase a new
basic property protection coverage [BPP] that would pay first-party benefits
only if the loss was attributable to the fault of another no-fault insured driv-
er;s ' or they could choose not to purchase first-party property damage insur-
ance. s2 In all instances, including the last, a property damage tort exemption
precluded the bringing of a tort claim against a no-fault insured third-party
tortfeasor unless one of several property damage thresholds was surpassed.
These thresholds were met when damages to the insured vehicle exceeded
$550, the damaged vehicle was parked, the at-fault insured driver was
engaged in "willful or wanton misconduct," or the at-fault vehicle was
being operated without the consent of the owner. s3 The structure of these
thresholds left each motorist to provide protection for damage to his own
vehicle when the total loss was less than $550, although actual self-
protection was not required. Hence, if a motorist chose not to obtain one of
the first-party property coverages and suffered damage of less than $550 to
his motor vehicle through the fault of another no-fault insured driver, then
the no-fault law left the motorist no right to recover in any mode. One year
and seven months after the Automobile Reparations Reform Act had been
in operation, the Florida Supreme Court invalidated the property damage
provisions on the ground that the tort exemption as applied in the situation
just described totally deprived motorists of the right to sue, without sufficient
justification or acceptable alternative.' 4
Fortunately for this study, the experimental design of the unscreened
sample called for examining claims arising from crashes in the months of
February and March of 1971, 1972, and 1973. This means that the last
crash giving rise to a claim in this study occurred not later than three
months and eleven days prior to the invalidation of the law.' 5 It will be
shown that claims involving only property damage were typically filed and
settled following a crash in a period of time much shorter than that. Con-
sequently, it is believed that the data in this study fairly represent the no-
fault property damage reparations system as it was operating up to the
time of invalidation.
79 PDL insurance is required for covered motorists by virtue of their having to
meet all the requirements of the Florida financial responsibility law, including the
property damage portion. See note 66 supra.
S0The Act referred to this as full coverage. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.738(2)(a)
(1974). Deductibles were allowable as in collision coverage. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 627.738(3) (1974).
81 The Act referred to this as basic coverage. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.738(2)(b)
(1974). Deductibles were allowable as in collision coverage. FLA, STAT. ANN.
§ 627.738(3) (1974).
82 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.738(1) (1974).
83 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.738(4) (1974).
84 Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d I (Fla. 1973).
85 Kluger v. White was rendered on July 11, 1973. Id.
[VOL. 9: 1
Effects of No-Fault in Florida
The property damage portion of this study was an integral part of the
experimental design that already has been explained in detail in connection
with personal injury claims. As mentioned previously, the property damage
claim population comes from the same total claim population that produced
the personal injury unscreened population. The number of property damage
claims was great enough that no augmentation by the inclusion of crashes
from additional months was necessary. The format of the presentation of
data and statistics will follow that used in the personal injury claim section
without repeating the explanation of procedures and assumptions detailed
there. One slight difference is that in some presentations mean values have
been used as the key statistic rather than median values. This was believed
to be justifiable because so few property damage claims remained unsettled
that no important effect on the final mean values would be felt. Two other
points need to be made. One is that the property damage claims used in
this study arose out of crashes that did not include a personal injury. The
rationale for this is the assumption that the handling of property damage
claims associated with personal injury crashes would generally be strongly
influenced by the handling of the personal injury claims. The second point
is that only claims that were covered by the no-fault law (or would have
been in respect to 1971 crashes had the law been in effect that year) are
included in the analyses.
Hypothesis 1: That no-fault will reduce the amount of litigation
arising out of automobile crashes in comparison with a tort sys-
tem.
It first should be noted that litigation involving only property damage
was found not to be occurring in the circuit courts of Alachua and Dade
Counties either before or after the implementation of the no-fault law. This
in part reflects the jurisdictional hurdles of the circuit courts, but is entirely
consistent with the premise that property damage claims themselves very
infrequently result in lawsuits. The insurance claim data completely cor-
roborate this assumption. As shown in Table Dl, the proportion of claims
settled without payment or by negotiation without suit always has been
high: ranging from 97.4 percent in 1971 and 1972 to 99.4 percent in 1973.
More detailed analysis showed that virtually the same distribution prevailed
for both first-party and third-party claims. As a corollary, the data show
TABLE D1
DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY DAMAGE
SETTLEMENT MODES
[Numbers represent percentage of total.]
1971 1972 1973
Closed Without Payment 4.1 8.1 0.1
Settled Before Suit Filed 93.3 89.3 99.3
Settled After Suit Filed 0.6 0.3 0.5
Settled at Judgment 0.6 0.1 0.1
Other 1.5 2.2 0.0
n= (1172) (1447) (1341)
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that the proportion of property damage insurance claims involving lawyers
has always been small and apparently became smaller under no-fault. The
percentage of claims in which lawyers apparently were not involved rose
from 95.8 percent in 1971, to 97.8 percent in 1972, and to 98.7 percent in
1973.
In summary, these data and analyses suggest that property damage
claims never have been burdensome sources of litigation and that the trend
seems to be toward further limitation. Nevertheless, by comparison to the
apparent changes occurring in personal injury claims, it may be concluded
that the reduction in litigation caused by the no-fault property damage law
was minimal.
Hypothesis 2: That the distribution of property damage claims
arising out of motor vehicle crashes between third-party and first-
party modes will shift strongly toward first-party modes in a no-
fault system.
Preliminarily, the insurance claim data as summarized in Table D2 show
that motorists covered by the no-fault law made marked changes in their
first-party property damage insurance-buying practices while the law was
in effect. Prior to no-fault, motorists had the choice of selecting some
collision coverage or choosing to remain unprotected. The data in Column
1 of Table D2 show that 14.3 percent of those in the unscreened crash
population had not bought first-party insurance in 1971 while 85.7 percent
had bought some form of collision coverage. Note that even the 14.3 per-
cent were not self-insurers as against damage caused by other at-fault
motorists. In 1973 the distribution shifted to 1.6 percent uninsured, 17.1
percent Basic Personal Protection (BPP) and the remainder collision or
collision and BPP, and in 1973 the distribution shifted again to only 1.1
percent uninsured, 12.0 percent BPP and the remainder in the other
categories. Several observations can be made about these data. One is, of
course, that most motorists were persuaded to purchase some sort of first-
party property damage coverage. Secondly, the BPP buyers were in effect
only half-insured, in that this coverage did not protect against damage
caused by the owner or suffered without fault of anyone. Finally, a majority
of the motorists were persuaded to purchase both BPP and collision cover-
ages. While this had the effect of eliminating the collision deductible when
TABLE D2
DISTRIBUTION OF FIRST-PARTY PROPERTY DAMAGE
INSURANCE COVERAGES
[Numbers represent percentages of total.]
1971 1972 1973
None 14.3 1.6 1.1
COLL-$50 Deductible 59.2 1.0 0.7
COLL-Other Deductible 26.5 1.3 0.7
BPP - 17.1 12.0
BPP & COLL - 78.9 85.6
n= (1175) (1444) (1344)
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damage was done at the fault of another person and, perhaps, of adding
certain elements to the recovery such as the rental cost of a replacement
vehicle while repairs were being made 8 the end result appears to be sub-
stantial overlapping coverage.
Having reviewed the changes in the structure of the law and the pattern
of insurance-buying practices, one would expect a strong shift from third-
party to first-party recovery modes between 1971 and the succeeding years.
The statistics in Table D3 show that this occurred. Third-party claims fell
from just less than 50 percent of the total to less than 20 percent in both
succeeding years. In sum, therefore, Hypothesis 2 can be accepted as
correct.
TABLE D3
DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY DAMAGE
CLAIMS BY TYPE
[Numbers represent percentage of total.]
1971 1972 1973
Property Damage Liability (PDL) 47.4 14.8 17.3
Collision (COLL) 52.5 49.2 39.7
Basic Property Protection (BPP) - 36.1 43.1
n= (1178) (1464) (1344)
Hypothesis 3: That the amount of time required for processing
claims and receiving benefits will be shortened in a no-fault sys-
tem as compared with a tort system.
In testing this hypothesis the same three time measurements defined in
the personal injury portion of the study8 7 were used. The findings are dis-
played in Figures D1 through D3. As in the personal injury graphs, the
first bar represents the population of third-party claims (PDL), the second
bar represents the population of first-party claims (COLL in 1971 and
COLL plus BPP in 1972 and 1973), and the third bar represents the popu-
lation of all the claims obtained by merging the two subpopulations. The
bars represent median values. Mean values and numbers of cases are pre-
sented below each bar.
An examination of Figures D I through D3 reveals that no great speeding
up of processing property damage claims occurred with the introduction of
Florida's no-fault law. Looking at the bar for "all" claims in all three
figures, one sees that while the time delay in filing a claim diminished from
a median value of 7.6 days to a value of 5.0 days between 1971 and 1973,
the time elapsed in making the first payment increased slightly from 6.3
days to 6.8 days, and the time elapsed in settling increased from 8.9 days to
12.4 days. The figures show that a major contribution to these increases
came from the third-party claims, whereas the reduction for time of filing
occurred in the first-party claims. The figures also suggest that a stabilized
86 See FLORIDA No-FAULT INSURANCE PRACTICE 160 (Fla. Bar Continuing Legal
Educ. 1972).
87 See part III A supra.
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Figure D1
TC-TIME ELAPSED:CRASH TO PROPERTY DAMAGE CLAIM
Unscreened Sample
1971
Median
(days)
3d P
Mean(days) 11.7
No. of cases 557
1st P all 3d P 1st P all 3d P lst P all
13.5 12.6 11.5 10.2 10.4 17.9 10.5 11.8
615 1175 215 1247 1466 228 1081 1309
Figure D2
TF- TIME ELAPSED: PROPERTY DAMAGE CLAIM
Unscreened Sample
TO FIRST PAYMENT
1971
Median
(days)
3d P
Mean (days) 27.2
No. of cases 414
lstP all
.18.5 23.0
388 804
3d P 1st P all 3d P 1st P all
44.7 13.7 18.8 44.5 12.9 19.6
173 864 1038 208 762 969
operation represented by the 1973 claims generally takes longer to process
each claim than the transition operation in 1972.
An explanation for the marked increases in TF and TS for third-party
claims is that the $550 threshold eliminated many of the minor claims
from the third-party population leaving only only the more costly claims
that require more investigation and are more likely to be contested. Hence,
it is not surprising that processing the remaining third-party claims takes
longer than before. Why there should be an increase in time to settle first-
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Figure D3
TS-TIME ELAPSED: PROPERTY DAMAGE CLAIM TO SETTLEMENT
Unscreened Sample
21.8
1971 1972 1973
Median
(days) 12A
11.5 
g 
.
89l7. 
9.0
3d P 1st P all 3d P 1st P all 3d P 1st P all
Mean(days) 35.4 25.8 29.5 47.7 19.7 24.2 53.1 23.1 29.3
No. of cases 446 445 893 195 1024 1221 220 843 1063
party claims is a little more complex. More detailed analyses showed that
the time to first payment and the time to settle collision claims actually
diminished slightly between 1971 and 1973. The increase, therefore, is due
to longer times taken to process BPP claims than COLL claims. To illus-
trate, the median values for TS were 8.7 and 11.2 days respectively for 1972
and 1973 BPP claims, whereas they were only 6.9 and 7.3 days for COLL
claims in the same two years. Presumably, processing BPP claims took
longer because of the necessity of determining that the damage was "caused
by the fault of another resulting from contact between the insured vehicle
and a vehicle with respect to which security"'8 was required under the no-
fault law. In contrast, benefits under collision coverage were payable with-
out respect to fault. Hence, it is apparent that the addition of an element of
fault in first-party coverages runs counter to the general goal of speeding
up payments and settlements.
In summary, these data do not suggest that the no-fault property damage
law brought any advantage to consumers when contrasted with the super-
seded recovery modes. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 as it applies to property
damage claims apparently must be rejected.
Hypothesis 4: That the allocation of benefits in accordance with
ascertainable losses will be more equitable in a no-fault system
than in a tort system.
Paralleling the personal injury analyses, several new parameters are de-
fined as follows:
Verified Property Damage = Total amount of property damage
claimed as verified by documentation in the insurance claim
file.
88 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.738(2)(b) (1974).
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Property Damage Payment = Total amount of payment made to
the claimant in respect to the property damage claim as verified
by documentation in the insurance claim file.
Extra Value = The difference between Property Damage Pay-
ment and Verified Property Damage.
RD = The ratio obtained by dividing Property Damage Payment
by Verified Property Damage. It represents the multiplier ef-
fect between the amount of damage and insurance payments.
Verified Property Damage is a measure of actual property damage repair
bills and estimates, and Property Damage Payment measures the amount of
money paid in respect to the claims arising out of crashes. Extra Value and
RD are both measures of the difference, if any, between damages and pay-
ments which might reflect either equities or nuisance value inherent in
property damage claims. It is largely these latter measures that pertain to
equity in the allocation of benefits.
Table D4 presents statistics representing these measures. Starting first
with Verified Property Damage, there is a general increasing trend over the
three years of the study. Using the COLL data as a guide, the value of the
general increase can be estimated to be 22 percent. It should be noted that
after 1971 third-party claims have the highest Verified Property Damage
value, whereas in 1971 COLL claims were greater. This switch undoubted-
ly reflects the influence of the property damage thresholds that has already
been discussed. 9 Perhaps of more interest is the fact that BPP Verified
Property Damage figures are substantially lower than COLL figures.
That a similar rising trend exists in Property Damage Payments is also
shown by Table D4. Interestingly enough, the differences between COLL
and BPP statistics diminish somewhat in this parameter. This is apparently
accounted for by two factors. One is that most COLL policies carry a
deductible with $50 being the most common amount. 90 The effect of this
factor shows up clearly in the median values of Extra Value for COLL
claims. A second factor was the ruling that reimbursement for rental cars
used while damaged vehicles were being repaired was an allowable item of
BPP recovery.0 1 Although insurers were required to offer this coverage as
an addition to normal collision coverages after 1972, -92 rental reimburse-
ment in the past was not included under collision policies. These two
factors-less frequent use of deductibles in BPP coverages and rental re-
imbursement-apparently accounted for the narrowing of the difference
between COLL and BPP Property Damage Payment statistics.
The effects of deductibles and rental reimbursement presumably account
89 See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
90 The Florida Insurance Commissioner had recommended that BPP policies be
written to be paid from a first dollar of damage basis rather than with deductibles
because of a small difference in consumer cost of the two. INSURANCE COMMISSIONER
BULLETIN OF OCTOBER 8, 1971, reproduced in FLORIDA No-FAULT INSURANCE PRAC-
TICE, supra note 86, at 159. No such recommendation was made in respect to
collision coverage. Apparently, insurance companies and buyers followed this
advice.
91 FLORIDA No-FAULT INSURANCE PRACTICE, supra note 86, at 159.
92 Id. at 160.
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for the differences in BPP and COLL Extra Values and RD's statistics
shown in Table D4. The Extra Value parameter and the RD parameter for
both the third-party and "all" populations suggest that property damage
claims typically carry little in the way of equity or nuisance value. Appar-
ently, property damage losses are usually paid in the exact amount of the
losses verified as having been sustained. Interestingly enough, the COLL
population tends to undercompensate, presumably because of deductibles,
and the BPP population seems to overcompensate, presumably because of
the rental reimbursement feature. Combining these two populations with
the third-party population produces a composite with slight undercompen-
sation.
In summary, it appears that property damage claims have little in the
way of either nuisance value or equities to create the speculative values and
resulting system costs seen in personal injury claims. Consequently, it does
not appear that a no-fault system in itself leads to a more equitable repara-
tion system so far as property damage claims are concerned. Nevertheless,
one factor not subjected to empirical testing in this study is worth mention-
ing. Under a pure fault system a motorist must purchase liability insurance
that will protect him against damage done to vehicles owned by other
motorists. Therefore, a person with an inexpensive vehicle must insure
against possible damage to more expensive vehicles. However, a pure no-
fault system, such as Florida's was not, would require only that each
motorist insure against damage to his own vehicle. Hence, owners of in-
expensive vehicles would presumably pay less. Under a threshold plan, as
Florida's was, this advantage does not prevail.
Hypothesis 5: That a property damage no-fault system will cost
less to operate than a tort system.
A parallel analysis to that used in testing this hypothesis for personal
injury no-fault reparations will be employed without reviewing the logic
in detail. The next two subsections will develop representative values to be
inserted in a premium-benefits matrix analogous to Matrix A generated in
the discussion of personal injury claims. That care must be taken in
generalizing the results seen in the sample populations needs repeating.
Nevertheless, it should be observed that the property damage claim samples
are much larger than the personal injury claim samples, permitting some-
what greater confidence in the validity of the results.
Premiums Paid-In the absence of data describing the total dollars
paid in property damage premiums, it was necessary to resort to the typical
premium procedure described in connection with personal injury claims. 93
Computed in accordance with that procedure, the normalized 94 relative
property damage insurance costs for Jacksonville and Miami are displayed
in Table D5. Unlike personal injury insurance costs, some difference in
effects on rates was felt by drivers with previously clean records as com-
pared with drivers with a prior crash. Interestingly enough, the increase in
93 See part III A supra.
94 See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
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rates of the prior "good" drivers was greater than the increase for prior
"bad" drivers. Overall the increase ranged between 15 percent and 17 per-
cent in the Miami area and 11 percent and 13 percent in the Jacksonville
area.95 While data are not available to produce a true mean value, it will be
assumed that a 14 percent increase typifies the motorists represented in the
study populations.
TABLE D5
RATIO OF COSTS OF PROPERTY DAMAGE INSURANCE
PACKAGES TO 1971 COSTS
A. Previously Clean Record Driver
Miami Area
1971 1972 1973
Relative Property Damage
Insurance Costs 1 1.15 1.15
Jacksonville Area
1971 1972 1973
Relative Property Damage
Insurance Costs 1 1.17 1.17
B. Driver with Prior Crash
Miami Area
1971 1972 1973
Relative Property Damage
Insurance Costs 1 1.11 1.11
Jacksonville Area
1971 1972 1973
Relative Property Damage
Insurance Costs 1 1.13 1.13
The data in Table D5 indicate that the costs of Florida's no-fault prop-
erty damage reparation system increased as measured simply by premiums
paid. This should be contrasted to the downward trend in personal injury
insurance costs as depicted in Table 110. However, other factors should be
considered. One such factor is simply that more drivers elected first-party
coverages than before as was shown in Table D2. Such extended coverage
naturally adds more costs to consumers but these increased costs should
eventually be reflected in increased benefits. The next subsection discusses
such benefits.
Benefits Paid-In accord with the procedure explained in detail in
the personal injury section, 96 calculations were made to produce repre-
sentative benefits paid per vehicle in the unscreened property damage popu-
lation. First, claims were allocated between first-party and third-party
95 After the no-fault property damage provisions were invalidated, the pre-no-
fault insurance system supplanted it. Interestingly enough, property damage pre-
miums fell in 1974 and readvanced in 1975. Parallel 1974 and 1975 figures for
Table D4 are as follows: Part A: Miami, 1.06 and 1.11; Jacksonville, 0.99 and
1.04. Part B: Miami, 1.08 and 1.13; Jacksonville, 1.0 and 1.05.
96 See part III A supra.
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modes.97 Next, the number of claims in each category per year98 was
divided by the number of registered vehicles in Florida for the respective
years.9 9 Then the resulting dividends were normalized to the 1971 "all"
claims statistic to produce the array of comparative frequencies of property
damage claims per registered passenger vehicle shown in Table D6.
TABLE D6
COMPARATIVE FREQUENCY OF PROPERTY DAMAGE CLAIMS
PER REGISTERED PASSENGER VEHICLE
1971 1972 1973
Total Property Damage Claims 1.00 1.13 1.01
Third-Party Claims 0.47 0.17 0.17
First-Party Claims 0.53 0.96 0.84
The statistics in Row 1 of Table D6 suggest a 13 percent rise in property
damage claims per registered vehicle in the unscreened population in 1972
but with a return to the pre-no-fault frequency in 1973. Nevertheless, Rows
2 and 3 depict a substantial shift from third-party to first-party claims.
By combining claim frequency data from Table D6 and total property
damage cost data derivable from information in Table D4, one may obtain
the ratio of property damage benefits in 1972 and 1973 per crash per
registered passenger vehicle to the comparable figure for 1971. The results
are presented in Table D7. This analysis suggests that the payments per
crash per registered vehicle in the unscreened claim population increased
by 22 percent in 1972 over 1971, and by 24 percent in 1973 over 1971.
With respect to benefits payments, therefore, the Florida no-fault property
reparation system appears to have been more generous than the tort system.
As in the case of personal injury payments, a representative non-no-
fault control can be generated by making certain assumptions. First, that
in the absence of no-fault the third-party to first-party claim distribution
would have continued as in 1971 and that increases in total property
damage payments would have followed the trend set by the COLL claims
in 1972 and 1973. Given these assumptions, a non-no-fault system would
have seen Comparative Benefits declining to 0.96 in 1972 and then rising
to 1.23 in 1973. Except for 1972, this very closely parallels the results
depicted in Table D7.
Summary-Data from Tables D5 and D7 may now be arrayed by
year to produce the first two rows of Matrix B below. The third row is
computed by dividing the values of Row 2 by those of Row 1.
97 See Table D3. COLL and BPP claims must be combined to obtain the total
number of first-party claims.
98 It was assumed that each closed claim file contained one claim for property
damage only. Distributions between first and third-parties were made in accordance
with the distributions of closed claims in each year.
99 See note 66 supra.
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TABLE D7
RATIO: PROPERTY DAMAGE BENEFITS PAID IN 1971 AND 1972
PER CRASH PER REGISTERED PASSENGER VEHICLE TO 1971 FIGURE
[Numbers are in dollars.]
E.
Ratio:
Annual
C. Surrogate
Surrogate D. PD Pay
A. B. PD Surrogate Per
Claims Mean PD* Pay/Claims PD Pay Vehicle
Per Pay Per Per Vehicle Per Vehicle to 1971
Vehicle Claim (A x B) C(1) + C(2) Figure
1971
Third-Party 0.47 332 156(1)
1971
First-Party 0.53 439 233(12)
1971
Total 389 1
1972
Third-Party 0.17 575 98(1)
1972
First-Party 0.96 392 376(2)
1972
Total 474 1.22
1973
Third-Party 0.17 528 90(1)
1973
First-Party 0.84 465 391(2)
1973
Total 481 1.24
*PD Pay-Property Damage Payment
MATRIX B
1971 1972 1973
Property Damage Premiums
Paid Per Vehicle 1 1.14 1.14
Property Damage Benefits
Paid Per Vehicle 1 1.22 1.24
B/P Ratio 1 1.07 1.09
The conclusion to be drawn from this information is that while both
premiums and the size of property damage benefit payments increased
under the Florida no-fault system, the benefits-to-premium [B/P] ratio also
increased. This suggests that the no-fault system was somewhat more cost-
efficient in transferring premiums paid to beneficiaries than was the super-
seded system.
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